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Abstract: Takeover regulation is fundamental to the efficient workings of the market for 
corporate control since it affects the size and distribution of expected gains to shareholders of 
targets and acquirers. To investigate the impact of takeover regulation on shareholders’ wealth 
distribution, we first construct a dynamic takeover law index consisting of six legal provisions 
for major European countries. Our index reveals that takeover law in the European Union has 
changed substantially over the past 25 years. We further examine the wealth effects of 
takeover law in European takeovers between 1986 and 2010. Our empirical results suggest 
that the effect of takeover law on target announcement returns and takeover premiums is 
positive, economically large, and statistically significant. We also find evidence that stricter 
takeover law does not reduce the returns to bidders. Overall, the effect of takeover law on 
total wealth effects from mergers and acquisitions is significantly positive. Finally, in terms of 
the components of our takeover law index, we find that the mandatory bid rule significantly 
increases the takeover premium, target announcement returns and combined returns; the 
ownership disclosure rule leads to higher target announcement returns and higher combined 
returns; whilst the fair-price rule and the squeeze-out rights rule may reduce the total gain 
enjoyed by the combined companies. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The potential of large societal and private wealth gains and losses, combined with a rich history 
and often heterogeneous legal and economic opinions, makes takeover regulation a complex 
and controversial topic among policymakers, managers, investors and academics alike. 
Ferrarini (2000); Berglöf and Burkart (2002) and Armour et al. (2007), among others, show that 
a well-regulated takeover market can create wealth for society by improving the allocation of 
productive resources. On the other hand, theoretical and empirical research agrees that an 
unregulated market for corporate control increases the cost of capital for firms by allowing 
inefficient transfers of control and thus fails to establish allocative efficiency (Goergen et al. 
2005; Berglöf and Burkart, 2003; Burkart and Panunzi, 2003; Bebchuk, 1994; Grossman and 
Hart, 1980).  
A large body of literature has estimated shareholder wealth effects using merger 
announcement returns when a firm is planning to adopt or repeal an antitakeover provision at 
the firm level, such as supermajority provisions or classified boards (Cuñat et al., 2012; Faleye, 
2007; DeAngelo and Rice, 1983; Linn and McConnell, 1983). Fewer studies have attempted to 
measure the wealth effects of state antitakeover law on firms incorporated in the respective 
state. Among these, studies of antitakeover laws in the state of Delaware find a positive or 
insignificant effect (Linn and McConnell, 1983; Jahera and Pugh, 1991), while antitakeover 
laws in other states seem to have a negative announcement effect (Karpoff and Malatesta, 1989; 
Giroud and Mueller, 2010). Straska and Waller (forthcoming) conclude that, notwithstanding 
the significance of individual findings, the available evidence is largely inconclusive as to 
whether antitakeover provisions increase or decrease shareholder wealth.  
In addition to its effects on announcement returns, state takeover regulation is found to be 
significantly associated with takeover frequency (Comment and Schwert, 1995; Daines, 2001), 
firm value (Karpoff and Malatesta, 1989, 1995; Daines, 2001), capital structure (Garvey and 
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Hanka, 1999; Wald and Long, 2007), takeover premium (Comment and Schwert, 1995; 
Sokolyk, 2011), bond values (Francis et al., 2010), and managerial entrenchment (Heron and 
Lewellen, 1998; Garvey and Hanka, 1999; Bebchuk and Cohen, 2003; Ryngaert and Scholten, 
2010; Sokolyk, 2011).  
To the best of our knowledge, however, there are no studies that try to assess the 
distribution of takeover gains between bidders and targets as a result of antitakeover legislation. 
This is despite the importance of a ‘level playing field’ and the relative power of the parties 
involved in a takeover that is frequently cited by legislators in the development of U.S. 
antitakeover law. Moreover, state antitakeover law has in most cases been enacted to protect 
local firms from hostile cross-state takeover attempts. While hostile takeovers constitute only a 
small fraction of all takeovers, we therefore aim to broaden the scope of the literature by 
estimating the effects of takeover legislation aimed at all takeovers regardless of the bidder’s 
attitude. At the same time, potentially adverse effects of state legislation on the frequency of 
value-increasing takeover is particularly important when assessing the social welfare effects of 
antitakeover law, while premiums paid to target shareholders can shed light on the process by 
which takeover regulation generates positive announcement returns.  
Within the law and finance literature, a related research stream studies a similar 
relationship between investor protection and capital market efficiency. Bris and Cabolis (2008) 
and Rossi and Volpin (2004) use the cross-sectional shareholder protection (anti-director) index 
developed by La Porta et al. (1998) or similar indices to investigate the effects of shareholder 
rights on takeover frequency, premiums or announcement returns. Bergström and Högfeldt 
(1997) have also attempted to model the impact of individual takeover regulations, such as the 
mandatory bid rule and the equal bid rule, on the efficiency of capital markets, but did not 
empirically assess their impact on target or bidder shareholders. Since existing shareholder 
protection indices are static by construction, it is not possible to test whether improvements in 
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investor protection at the country level have positive effects on financial markets (Bris and 
Cabolis, 2008). 
While the majority of the extant literature is heavily skewed to the examination of U.S. 
antitakeover regulation, far less attention has been paid to the European market.3 Despite the 
increased value and number of transactions by European firms in recent takeover waves 
(Martynova and Renneboog, 2008a, 2011b) and the introduction of the European takeover 
directive in 2004,4 the optimal breadth and depth of takeover regulation in the European 
counties, with respect to wealth gains and transfers in takeovers, have not been empirically 
investigated. 
The aim of this paper is to fill these gaps by empirically evaluating the effects of laws 
governing takeover bids on wealth distribution and the efficiency of takeover regulation. The 
heterogeneous capital markets in Europe provide an opportunity to explore the effects of 
takeover law in a set of countries over time and during a critical phase of the development of 
their capital market and market for corporate control. After the Takeover Directive had been 
implemented by EU member states, European takeover regulation reached a steady state around 
2008. The available sample of takeovers thus spans the most active period of legal 
developments in takeover regulation and now covers all critical sub-periods. We are thus able 
for the first time to evaluate the effects of national takeover law as a whole and of individual 
provisions in practice for European countries. Specifically, we try to identify whether takeover 
law create or reduce wealth to shareholders and aim to answer the following questions: (1) Does 
stricter takeover law protect minority shareholders and generate a higher return for the target 
shareholders? (2) Does stricter takeover law hurt the bidding firms and reduce the gains to the 
acquirers from takeovers? (3) What is the overall wealth effect for shareholders involved in 
                                               
3 Hagendorff et al. (2012) examine the takeover premium paid in bank takeovers and find that stricter bank 
regulation and stronger deposit insurance schemes lower the takeover premium paid to EU targets. 
4 Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on Takeover Bids, O.J. 
2004 L 142/12 
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takeovers? (4) Which legal provisions matter most in explaining the variation of takeover gains 
for targets and bidders? 
To answer these questions, we construct a dynamic takeover law index that reflects the 
evolution and quality of takeover law in EU economies with respect to the (re-)distribution of 
wealth in takeovers. The index, which is designed to capture the most critical elements of 
takeover law, includes six provisions: ownership disclosure, mandatory bid, fair price for the 
minority shareholders, squeeze-out rights, sell-out rights, and management neutrality.5 A higher 
index score represents a more stringent takeover regulation in a given country, in other words, 
a market for corporate control more favourable to target shareholders. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first study to create a comprehensive and dynamic takeover law index 
for EU countries, which enables a straightforward comparison between countries in terms of 
their market regulations for corporate control. 
We empirically examine the effects of takeover regulation on shareholders’ wealth for both 
target firms and bidding firms in the period 1986-2010. We focus on announcement returns as 
a proxy for expected wealth generation and wealth transfer in takeovers and compare them to 
takeover premiums as a measure of the bidder’s willingness to pay. Consistent with our 
hypotheses, our results show that a stricter takeover law provides better protection for the 
minority shareholders in the target firms in the case of a takeover bid. The results provide strong 
evidence for an economically positive and statistically significant effect of a strict takeover law. 
In economic terms, the result demonstrates that changing from the weakest takeover law to the 
strongest takeover law is associated with a 44 percentage points increase in the takeover 
premium paid to the target shareholders and a 25 percent higher announcement return for target 
shareholders. We further investigate which takeover law provision matters in determining the 
wealth distribution to target shareholders in mergers and acquisitions. Table 1 shows a summary 
                                               
5 The scores and the sources of the takeover law index are provided in separate appendices, which are available 
from authors upon request. 
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of the findings. Our evidence suggests that the ownership disclosure rule and the mandatory bid 
rule significantly increase the takeover premium paid to the target shareholders as well as target 
announcement returns. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Notably, our findings do not support the hypothesis that stricter takeover law reduces the 
returns to bidders. We find similar results for individual takeover law provisions. All our 
estimations control for deal features and firm characteristics and are robust to the addition of 
shareholder and creditor protection measures. Most importantly, our findings suggest that 
stricter takeover regulation increases the total wealth for the combined companies. The results 
on combined announcement returns for targets and bidders support this hypothesis. The 
evidence suggests that stricter takeover laws significantly increase the total weighted wealth 
gains for targets and bidders through 5 percent higher combined announcement returns. This 
indicates an improved efficiency in mergers and acquisitions under a stricter takeover law.  
A mediation test for offer premiums shows that takeover law creates this effect mainly 
through higher offer premiums, but also directly increases announcement returns for bidders as 
well as the combined entity. To further explore the total wealth effects of takeover law, we 
exclude the U.K. targets in a closer examination. The result presents a statistically positive but 
economically stronger effect of the takeover law index, the ownership disclosure rule and the 
mandatory bid rule on the weighted announcement returns for non-UK targets. Interestingly, 
the results indicate that the fair price rule and the squeeze-out rights rule tend to reduce the total 
wealth of the combined companies when we exclude U.K. targets. 
Our paper contributes to the extant literature (Nenova, 2003; Rossi and Volpin, 2004) by 
constructing a dynamic takeover law index. Most importantly, the multi-country structure of 
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our original takeover law index allows us for the first time to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity in the time dimensions. We can identify effects of regulation on total shareholder 
wealth where previous studies were not able to control for time effects due to a lack of a time 
variation in their legal variables of interest or insufficient cross-country variation. Another 
important contribution is our empirical evaluation of the effects of national takeover law as a 
whole and individual takeover provisions in European countries. More specifically, we identify 
the effects of takeover regulation on offer premiums and announcement returns for both bidders 
and targets. Our closer examination of the combined bidder-target wealth effects is particularly 
important, because premiums enjoyed by target shareholders may in part represent transfers 
from bidders (Burkart, 1999). Combined with an estimation of the likelihood of a successful 
takeover, this analysis offers valuable insights into the redistributive wealth effects of takeovers 
and the broader impact of takeover regulation in practice.6 The dynamic takeover law index and 
our empirical findings are of interest to policy makers, practitioners, managers, investors and 
academic alike by providing an evaluation of the most salient policy options and the economic 
implications of takeover regulation. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops our hypotheses. 
Section 3 outlines the construction of the takeover law index and analyzes the evolution of 
takeover law in the EU. Section 4 describes the acquisition dataset and introduces our 
identification strategy. Section 5 presents the empirical results on takeover premiums, 
announcement returns to targets and bidding firms and the likelihood of a successful takeover. 
Robustness analyses are reported in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. 
                                               
6 To the best of our knowledge, there are no previous studies that empirically examine the wealth distribution 
effect of takeover regulation in a takeover bid, though takeover regulation has attracted the attention of 
policymakers, managers, investors and academics alike with the increased value and number of transactions 
since early 1980s (Grossman and Hart, 1980; DeAngelo and Rice, 1983; Linn and McConnell, 1983; Bebchuk, 
1994; Comment and Schwert, 1995; Ferrarini, 2000; Berglöf and Burkart, 2003; Rossi and Volpin, 2004; 
Goergen et al. 2005; Armour et al., 2007; Martynova and Renneboog, 2008a; Ferrarini and Miller, 2010; Cuñat 
et al., 2012; Straska and Waller, forthcoming). 
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2. HYPOTHESES 
According to Berglöf and Burkart (2002), the aim of any takeover law is to protect the minority 
shareholders in a takeover bid and the promotion of an efficient market for corporate control. 
In other words, an appropriate takeover law balances the relationship between targets and 
bidders, minority shareholders and majority shareholders, and shareholders and managers. 
Stricter takeover law could benefit the target shareholders in many ways, in which the central 
provisions are associated with information disclosure, equal opportunities and defensive 
measures available to the target management.  
Firstly, ownership disclosure requires an early disclosure of the toehold that potential 
buyers have acquired in target firms. This initial stake in a target firm is the primary source of 
profits for the bidder (Walkling, 1985; Choi, 1991; Burkart, 1999). Authors dating back to 
Bebchuk (1982) have proposed that improved regulations, such as better information 
disclosure, increase the chances of competing acquirers launching a bid. A tougher disclosure 
rule makes it easier for rivals to “free ride” on the initial bidder’s efforts to search and screen 
an appropriate target (Grossman and Hart, 1980). To deter other potential buyers from entering 
the bidding process, the initial bidder can raise the price offered to target shareholders; in order 
to further gain control of the target firm, the successful bidder may end up bidding a share price 
higher than what they would otherwise pay without a competing bidder. Thus, the competition 
fostered by a stricter disclosure environment is likely to increase the takeover premium.  
Ownership disclosure also increases the transparency of a takeover bid and protects the 
minority shareholders, since it is often combined with a mandatory bid rule that compels bidders 
to submit a tender offer once they cross certain ownership thresholds (Franks and Mayer, 1996; 
Zingales, 2004; Armour et al., 2007; Siems, 2008; Chen, Chen and Wei, 2009; Schouten and 
Siems, 2010). However, lower disclosure requirements, which render the further purchase of 
the shares less attractive, will reduce the number of takeover bids and subsequently lead to a 
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less active market for corporate control (Zingales, 2004; La Porta et al, 2000). Better 
information disclosure will also improve the bargaining power of the shareholders and 
managers in target firms because, with the relevant information, they can evaluate the bid 
properly and time the bid to extract a higher premium (Armour et al., 2007; Chen, Chen and 
Wei, 2009; Schouten and Siems, 2010). As a result of transparency and fairness considerations, 
the ownership disclosure rules have become more stringent over time as they converged across 
counties (Siems, 2008; Schouten and Siems, 2010). 
Secondly, equal opportunities for all investors and the fair treatment of minority 
shareholders are the most important elements for any takeover law (Goergen et al., 2005). With 
stricter takeover law, minority shareholders obtain better protection and have more chances to 
participate in the takeover process. For example, the mandatory bid rule obliges a bidder to 
make a tender offer to all outstanding shares once the direct or indirect holdings have 
accumulated to a certain percentage of voting rights. Therefore, it protects the minority 
shareholders by providing them with an opportunity to exit the company, especially when 
combined with a fair price rule (Bebchuk, 1994; Macey et al., 1995; Skog, 1997; Bergström 
and Högfeldt, 1997; Burkart, 1999; Ferrarini, 2000; Berglöf et al., 2003; Goergen et al., 2005; 
Ferrarini and Miller, 2010). Such protection of minority shareholders is important to encourage 
them to participate in stock markets, especially in firms with concentrated ownership (Goergen 
et al., 2005). At the same time, an improved position of minority shareholders guarantees that 
the premium enjoyed by the controlling parties, which often largely corresponds to the 
dominant shareholders’ private benefits, is shared with the target minority shareholders at the 
time of the takeover (Bebchuk, 1994; Skog, 1997; Ferrarini, 2000; Berglöf et al., 2003; Goergen 
et al., 2005;  Ferrarini and Miller, 2010).  
In addition, strict takeover law also sets up the rules related to the orderly process of a 
takeover bid, which results in the bargaining power shifting from the bidder to the target. For 
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example, the sell-out rights rule offers minority shareholders the right to require the majority 
owner to buy them out at a certain level of shareholdings. It protects minority shareholders and 
effectively reduces the pressure from minority shareholders to tender the shares. With increased 
bargaining power, target shareholders are more likely to receive a higher takeover premium. 
Thus, the sell-out rights rule may have a positive effect on the takeover efficiency and the 
minority interests (Burkart and Panunzi, 2003). The counterpart of the sell-out rights rule is the 
squeeze-out rights rule which grants the bidders a right to purchase the remaining shares after 
they exceed a certain ownership level. The squeeze-out rights rule can be used to control the 
free-rider problem by the bidders and dilute the value of the minority shareholders (Yarrow, 
1985). Thus, it could hurt the minority shareholders in the case of a takeover bid. 
Thirdly, takeover law also governs the use of defensive tactics in a takeover bid by the 
target management. Supporters of board defence school believe that providing boards with the 
power to defend themselves in takeovers should be beneficial, because takeover defence is used 
by the target management when they believe the firm has hidden values or when they believe 
resistance will increase the bidding price (Bebchuk, 2002). With better information in an 
imperfect capital market, the management negotiation on behalf of the shareholders prevents 
coercive bids (Berglöf et al., 2003; Bebchuk, 2002). However, with more defensive tactics, 
target management could have more opportunities to pursue objectives other than the interests 
of the shareholders (Garvey and Hanka, 1999). In the context of takeovers, this agency problem 
is more severe because boards are self-interested, hence they should not have defence power in 
takeover bids (Garvey and Hanka, 1999; Bebchuk, 2002; McCahery et al., 2003; Goergen et 
al., 2005; Sokolyk, 2011). By allowing the target management to protect their private benefits 
at the expense of shareholders, takeover defenses increase the costs of a takeover bid and 
consequently lead to fewer takeovers. To reduce the agency problem, strict takeover law tends 
to limit the anti-takeover measures that target managements might be entitled to use in a 
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takeover bid.7 For example, the management neutrality rule compels the target management to 
obtain the explicit authorization from its shareholders before they adopt any defensive actions 
to frustrate a takeover bid. It effectively addresses the potential agency problems between the 
shareholders and the target management (Bebchuk, 2002; McCahery et al., 2003; Goergen et 
al., 2005). Therefore, stricter takeover law, by reducing the agency problem in a takeover bid, 
should generate a higher takeover premium.  
Combining the above aspects of information disclosure, free riding, equal opportunities, 
improved bargaining power of minority shareholders and reduced agency problems, we propose 
the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The stricter the takeover law, the higher the takeover premium paid to target 
shareholders. 
 
While takeover premiums present the bidder’s willingness to pay, announcement returns 
reflect the market expectation of wealth generation and wealth transfer in takeovers. Increased 
premiums translate into higher welfare for target shareholders only under additional 
assumptions. Actual wealth gains depend on the likelihood of additional post-announcement 
premium adjustments by the bidding firm as well as the chance for a successful completion of 
the transaction. Rational investors will factor these probabilities into their assessment of the 
target firm’s share price. A comparison of announcement returns and premiums provides 
insights into the importance of takeover law for actual wealth gains and the expected success 
probabilities of takeovers. As discussed before, a stricter takeover law provides better protection 
to target shareholders in the context of information disclosure, equal opportunities and 
defensive tactics available to target management. Accordingly, investors perceive a stricter 
                                               
7 State anti-takeover regulation is different in this context due to the history of corporate governance system in 
the U.S.A. and the large proportion of hostile transactions. 
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takeover law as a positive signal to the market, which will lead to higher returns to target 
shareholders. We therefore posit the following: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Stricter takeover law will result in higher target announcement returns. 
 
The two conflicting objectives of takeover law imply that rules limiting the opportunity of 
a bidder to launch a bid, as discussed before, may result in wealth losses for the bidding firms 
due to the increased legal barriers. Jarrell and Bradley (1980) suggest that, under takeover 
regulations which increase the competition from rival bidders, potential bidders hardly have 
any incentive to launch a takeover bid in the first place and the takeover gains to the bidders 
could be substantially reduced. Some scholars argue that better protection of the rights of the 
minority shareholders, such as the mandatory bid rule, eliminates the inefficient control transfer 
at the cost of discouraging more efficient control transfers (Bebchuk, 1994; Bergström and 
Högfeldt, 1997; Bergström, Högfeldt, Molin, 1997; Berglöf et al., 2003; Burkart and Panunzi, 
2003; Goergen et al., 2005). By setting a lower threshold of the mandatory bid rule, it makes 
the transactions more expensive to acquiring firms, which could decrease the chance of the 
value-creating restructuring (Bebchuk, 1994; Burkart and Panunzi, 2003). With increased 
bargaining power of minority shareholders, the sell-out rights rule could have a negative impact 
on the likelihood of the value-creating takeovers because it could reduce the gains of bidding 
firms (Goergen et al., 2005). In addition, stricter takeover law could result in wealth transfers 
from bidders to targets because most of the gains are “free-riding” by the target shareholders 
(Grossman and Hart, 1980). Accordingly, we suggest the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The implementation of a stricter takeover law results in lower announcement 
returns to bidders. 
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A well-regulated takeover market creates wealth for society by allocating the productive 
resources in an efficient way (Ferrarini, 2000; Berglöf and Burkart, 2002; Armour et al., 2007; 
Ferrarini and Miller, 2010). As we discussed before, target announcement returns can be higher 
due to improved efficiency, increased bargaining power, or better protection from takeover 
regulation; while bidding companies may lose relative market value proportionately due to 
wealth transfers to target shareholders, increased legal barriers, or merger arbitrage shorting 
selling (Mitchell et al., 2004). Therefore, the combined target-plus-bidder announcement return 
should reflect the total wealth effects of takeover law if takeover laws succeed in protecting the 
welfare of minority shareholders and promoting the efficient allocation of economic resources. 
Accordingly, we propose the benefits of a stricter takeover law outweigh the costs in the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The implementation of a stricter takeover law increases the weighted total 
announcement returns in target and bidding firms. 
 
3. TAKEOVER LAW INDEX 
3.1 Constructing the takeover law index 
Constructing a takeover law index is meaningful from a law and finance perspective as it 
provides a direct and systematic comparison of takeover law through time and across countries. 
With the exception of Nenova’s (2003) cross-sectional indices for the development of takeover 
law, no indices exist that comprehensively capture regulations relevant in takeovers.8 Unlike 
                                               
8 Nenova (2003) examines the control block premium by considering the impact of takeover regulation, where 
takeover regulation is proxied by three variables in 1997. 
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the static takeover law index proposed by Nenova (2003), we construct the index in a dynamic 
form in this study because the law regulating takeovers has substantially changed in the past 
two decades. The dynamic nature of our index is critical for the identification of economic 
effects distinct from unobserved cross-sectional country effects. 
The choice of components for the takeover law index is not straightforward, because the 
law executed today may not have been applicable 10 or 20 years ago. In addition, the selection 
of takeover law provisions should represent the effect of takeover law provisions across 
different countries and not draw from a particular country’s perspective. Therefore, we consider 
the most critical provisions associated with the central elements in a takeover law, for example, 
information disclosure, equal opportunities and management position in a takeover. 
The choice of the components of our takeover law index is based on the function of 
takeover law and the procedure of a takeover bid in practice.9 Specifically, this study focuses 
on six crucial takeover law provisions in the construction of the index: ownership disclosure 
thresholds,10 the mandatory bid rule, the fair price rule (or equal opportunity rule) for minority 
shareholders, squeeze-out rights, sell-out rights, and management neutrality. These six 
provisions are critical in a takeover bid because they directly determine the bidder’s incentive 
to make a takeover bid and the target’s acceptance of a bid. To this end, considering these 
provisions effectively captures the conflicts of interest between targets and bidders, minority 
and majority shareholders, and shareholders and managers in the case of a takeover bid.  
Another complex issue in coding and weighting any legal rules is to what extent we should 
code a rule to better reflect the diversity and the quality of the rules. The six takeover law 
                                               
9 In practice, before a bidder attempts to make a takeover bid, the acquirer needs to consider at least five critical 
thresholds regulated by the target country. These thresholds are related to ownership disclosure (e.g., 2% in 
Italy), mandatory bid thresholds (e.g., 30% in the U.K.), effective control of the target firms (e.g., 50% in 
Germany), squeeze-out rights by acquirers above a certain ownership stake (e.g., 90% in Sweden) and sell-out 
rights by minority shareholders (e.g., from 95% in France). 
10 The requirement of the ownership disclosure varies in European countries. The EU decisions eliminate the 
differences in the national legislation and harmonize the regulation of the ownership disclosure in European 
countries, particularly Directive 88/627/EEC, Directive 2001/34/EC and Directive 2004/109/EC. For the detail 
of the above mentioned Directive, please go to the official website of the European Union, europa.eu. 
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provisions in the index evolve over time and present great variation. To better capture the effect 
of the rules in practice, individual takeover law provisions are normalized in the range zero to 
one with various values to capture the difference and the complexity of takeover law provisions 
when it applies. For example, we set the index component for ownership disclosure equal to 
one if the shareholders have to disclose ownership when owning at least 3 percent of the 
company's capital, equal to 0.75 if this threshold is 5 percent, equal to 0.5 for a 10 percent 
threshold, equal to 0.25 if the threshold is 25 percent and zero otherwise. Table 2 defines the 
coding of takeover law provisions. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
In coding the index, we take into account takeover law and regulation, companies law, 
securities laws, and stock exchange regulations. The raw legal data are derived directly from 
the primary legislation in a given country (i.e., laws, regulations and decrees).11 The takeover 
law index is calculated as the sum of the six takeover law components. The squeeze-out rule is 
coded in reverse (minus one if there is a squeeze-out rule in place and zero otherwise), because 
we expect squeeze-out threshold defined by law to benefit the bidder, contrary to the other 
takeover law provisions which aim to protect target shareholders. This gives a theoretical total 
range of [-1, 5]. A higher index score represents a stricter takeover law from the bidder’s 
viewpoint, but a more favorable legal environment for target shareholders. 
3.2 The development of EU takeover laws from 1986 to 2010 
The quality of takeover laws in European countries has substantially improved over the last 25 
years. Figure 1 demonstrates the development of takeover law in the EU. In general, there are 
                                               
11 Appendix B summarizes the sources of the takeover law provisions. References of the sources in national 
language are available from authors upon request. 
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three big turning points between 1986 and 2010. The first improvement occurs in 1989. Before 
1989, only a few countries provided a good protection to the target shareholders in the case of 
a takeover bid. The average score of the takeover law index is 0.86 out of a score of 5 in the 
year 1988, in which the highest level of protection is provided by the U.K., Denmark and 
Sweden.12 The second improvement happens in the late 1990s. With the trend of globalization 
and the development of the stock market, more takeover bids occurred after 1996, and the 
number of the takeovers peaked in 2000 (see Table 4). Growing takeover activity might have 
drawn the attention of regulators to provide an appropriate takeover law to facilitate the market 
for corporate control and benefit the economy. Simultaneously, the increased number of 
takeover bids may also have led to a higher demand for an appropriate takeover law to protect 
the target shareholders.13 The third improvement took place after 2006 with the introduction of 
the European Directive 2004/25/EC. Its adoption in member states generated a significant 
enhancement of the quality of takeover laws in this period (see Table 3). In 2009, the average 
takeover law index reached its highest level during the sample period of 3.47. 
Our index indicates that takeover laws in EU countries have been substantially improved 
over the last 25 years, especially in terms of the protection offered to the minority shareholders. 
The mean value of the takeover law index for the sixteen major European countries was 0.67 
(out of a score of 5) in 1986, but it has reached 3.47 in 2010. Despite the increased demand of 
an appropriate takeover law, there are a number of other factors that could contribute to the 
evolution of takeover laws in EU countries, such as the trend of globalization, the development 
of the stock market and the efforts of the European Commission to implement the European 
Directive 2004/25/EC on Takeover Bids. 
                                               
12 The protection for the minority shareholders in Ireland is similar to the UK because the takeovers in Ireland are 
regulated by the UK City Code before 1997. 
13 During the collection of takeover regulation, we noticed that there were many letters from the target firms to the 
regulators which require a particular protection to the target shareholders. 
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[Figure 1 about here] 
 
To understand better the development and convergence of takeover law in EU countries, 
it is crucial to understand the attempt of the Commission to harmonize the EU takeover market 
and set up a minimum regulation at EU level. Of pivotal importance is that, in January 1989, 
the Commission proposed the 13th Council Directive on company law, which introduced the 
voluntary codes concerning the takeovers and other general bids. After decades of negotiation, 
in May 2004, the Directive entered into force, with a requirement for the transposition into the 
member states’ law by May 2006. By providing a minimum harmonization of takeover bids, it 
positively contributes to the integration of EU capital markets (Wymeersch, 2008). 
The key provisions of the Directive require that each member nation shall have a 
mandatory bid rule in place; while the threshold of the mandatory bid is defined by the member 
state; national law should contain the provisions for squeeze-out rights and sell-out rights 
following a successful takeover bid. In addition, the Directive adopts the management neutrality 
rule and requires that any action to frustrate a takeover bid must be approved by a general 
meeting of the shareholders. However, the management neutrality rule is optional for member 
states or companies.14 
Table 3 reports the implementation effect of the Directive on the takeover law index and 
takeover law provisions for the sixteen major European countries. As shown in Table 3, the 
implementation of the Directive mainly affects the mandatory bid, the sell-out rights rule and 
the management neutrality rule in EU countries. In 9 out of 16 countries, the national takeover 
laws are affected by the implementation of the Directive. Among these countries, Luxembourg, 
                                               
14 It is possible for a member state to opt out, but the company may nonetheless decide to adopt it. 
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Spain and Greece have changed at least three provisions in their national takeover laws to meet 
the minimum requirement of the Directive. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
4. DATA AND METHOD 
4.1 Identification of takeovers 
To examine the effect of takeover law, takeovers in EU countries are identified for the period 
between 1986 and 2010 from Thomson Financial (SDC Platinum). We include all tender offers, 
mergers and acquisitions, but exclude minority stake purchases, leverage buyouts, 
privatizations, spin-offs, recapitalizations, self-tender offers, exchange offers and repurchases. 
This specific period is selected because takeovers started to be prevalent after the 1986 Single 
Market Act was signed in the European Union. It also covers the evolution of several countries’ 
takeover law both before and after becoming EU member states. The sample meets the 
following requirements: (1) takeovers, announced between 1986 and 2010,  are targeting EU 
firms; (2) targets are publicly traded firms in a given EU country, while bidders are publicly 
traded firms around the world; (3) the bidder owns less than 50 percent of the target shares 
before the deal and intends to own more than 50 percent of the target firm after the transaction; 
(4) deal value is disclosed and is at least one million US dollars; (5) multiple bids announced 
within 14 days are excluded from the analysis; (6) bid price is available from Thomson 
Financial, LexisNexis or the Financial Times; and (7) share prices are available from 
Datastream. These requirements result in a final sample of 1,273 takeovers, involving the target 
firms from the sixteen major European countries. The sample takeovers are made by 969 unique 
bidders, with a total deal value of US$ 2,151 billion and an average of US$ 1,690.1 million. 
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Table 4 highlights the three countries where firms have actively acted as the bidders and 
the targets: the U.K., France and Germany. The second largest proportion of bidders, with 14 
percent, is from the U.S. As can also be seen from Table 4, the market for control grew slowly 
during the 1990s, developed rapidly from 1997 and peaked with the dot.com boom in 2000. 
The takeover activities decreased significantly following the burst of the high-tech bubble and 
the decline of the stock market in 2001. Though there was a slight rebound in 2005, the number 
of EU takeovers decreased again following the global economic recession in 2008.   
 
[Table 4 about here] 
4.2 Dependent variables 
To examine empirically the impact of takeover law, we employ the takeover premium to 
measure the returns to target shareholders and the announcement cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) to measure expected gains to bidders and target shareholders. Similar to Rossi and 
Volpin (2004) and Alexandridis et al. (2012), we calculate takeover premiums as bid price over 
the share price of the target on the day before the announcement minus one.15As shown in Table 
4, the mean (median) level of the takeover premium is 31 percent (26 percent) for EU target 
firms. Similar findings are also reported for the European targets in Rossi and Volpin (2004) 
and Alexandridis et al. (2012), though previous studies find that the average premium paid to 
the targets in the U.S. has been between 40 percent and 60 percent (Officer, 2003; Laamanen, 
2007; Betton et al., 2008).  
To estimate returns to shareholders of both firms involved in the takeover, we follow 
Martynova and Renneboog (2008b) and calculate the CARs of the bidding firms over the event 
                                               
15 We also test share prices four weeks before the announcement alternative in the denominator. Results are 
qualitatively similar, but weaker, as one would expect if the announcement effect is concentrated in a narrow 
window around the announcement day. 
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window [-2, +2] around the takeover announcement, where day 0 is the announcement date. 
We use a market model with local market indices to calculate the abnormal returns, where 
parameters are estimated over the period of 260 to 43 trading days prior to the takeover 
announcement. Table 4 reports that the mean value of the announcement CARs for targets is 
17.3 percent, while acquirers earn -0.6 percent on average. To test the overall economic gains 
for targets and acquirers, we calculate a total CAR weighted by firms’ market capitalizations 
two event days before the announcement. All mean announcement returns are significant at the 
one per cent level. 
 Finally, we aim to link takeover premiums to target announcement returns by estimating 
the likelihood of a successful transaction. This binary success indicator is directly derived from 
Thomson Financial data on whether a deal was completed. Variable definitions and data sources 
are summarized in Appendix A. 
4.3 Deal features 
Deal features that have explained target returns in previous studies are controlled for in our 
analysis, that is, cash payment method, hostile deals, diversified takeovers, toehold and cross-
border transactions (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Martynova and Renneboog, 2008b; Bauguess et 
al., 2009; Betton et al., 2009). Cash-only payments constitute a substantial fraction of the 
sample, with 39.1 percent of takeovers paid by cash only. Hostile takeovers of a public firm are 
still relatively rare in EU countries, with only 10 percent of takeovers being hostile during the 
sample period. Before the takeover announcement, bidders, on average, hold 5.4 percent of the 
target shares, although the median bidder does not own target shares. Cross-border transactions 
are frequent in our sample (39 percent), which to some extent indicates the European market’s 
integration and the importance of an internationally compatible takeover law. 
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4.4 Firm characteristics 
The market’s anticipation of a takeover and the premium paid by the bidder are associated with 
specific target firm characteristics, such as the pre-announcement firm performance and 
managerial ability. Based on the previous studies, we include Tobin’s Q, cash flow, leverage, 
financial distress, and target pre-announcement run-up stock price in our regression analysis 
(Lang et al., 1989; Morck et al., 1990; Servaes, 1991; Moeller et al., 2004; Dong et al., 2006; 
Bebchuk et al., 2009; Alexandridis et al., 2012; Jensen, 1986; Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989; King 
and Padalko, 2005; Schwert, 1996; Meulbroek, 1992). Target pre-announcement stock price 
run-up could reflect public information about the takeovers, an increase in the target’s stand-
alone value, or illegal insider trading (Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989; King and Padalko, 2005; 
Schwert, 1996; Meulbroek, 1992). We use the target run-up CAR to proxy for target pre-
announcement stock price run-up. Finally, the target industry and country are considered in all 
the regressions. 
Firm accounting numbers are based on the fiscal year before the takeover announcement. 
The mean level of total assets is US$ 7.5 billion for the bidders and US$ 1.4 billion for the 
targets. The difference of the total assets between bidders and targets is significant at the 1 
percent level. Bidders have a higher cash flow ratio than targets, with a statistically significant 
difference at the 1 percent level. Bidders have a mean age of 15.4 years, significantly older than 
the target’s mean age of 13.2 years. 
4.5 Identification strategy 
To explore the effect of takeover law represented by a takeover index and individual provisions 
(our key independent variables) on takeover premiums and announcement returns, we use 
ordinary least squares regressions. The likelihood that an attempted takeover is successful is 
estimated using Probit models. To control for the additional factors that might affect these 
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dependent variables, we include firm characteristics and deal features into our models. Year 
and country dummies are included the regressions to control for potentially unobserved year 
and country effects. We obtain identification of takeover effects from country-year variation in 
our key independent variables. Since we include country effects and year effects, the remaining 
country-year variation that is not captured by country and year dummies can be used to estimate 
the effects of takeover law if we assume that unique variation in country-years is indeed caused 
by changes in takeover law. 
5. THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF TAKEOVER LAW 
Takeover law could affect the welfare gains in takeovers in various ways. It may increase the 
bidder’s willingness to pay for the target’s shares or it may change the likelihood of successful 
takeovers due to increased or decreased legal complexity in the acquisition process. We test the 
implication of takeover law by first examining takeover premiums as a proxy for the bidder’s 
willingness to pay. In the second step, we assess the contribution of takeover law to expected 
gains for target shareholders, which in principle should be moderated by the probability of 
successful completion of the transaction. An assessment of total shareholder gains for targets 
and acquirers concludes the analysis. 
5.1 Takeover premium 
Regression results on the relationship between takeover law and takeover premium are 
consistent with our hypothesis that the stricter the takeover law, the higher the takeover 
premium paid to the target shareholders. Model 1 in Table 5 reports a significant and positive 
effect of stricter takeover law on the takeover premium. The economic significance of the effect 
of takeover law is substantial. Changing from the weakest protection generated from a takeover 
law (a takeover index of –1) to the strongest protection (a takeover index of 5) increases the 
takeover premium by 44 percentage points. While controlling for firm characteristics, deal 
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features as well as fixed country and year factors in our regression analysis, we can identify a 
positive effect of takeover law by using the variation in individual country-years. Therefore, 
the results empirically show that, in practice, takeover law effectively protects the rights of the 
minority shareholders in the target firms in the case of a takeover bid. 
Controlling for year and country effect is important in order not to attribute variation in 
offer premiums to takeover law when they are caused by macroeconomic trends or unobserved 
country factors, such as economic development, non-company legal frameworks or cultural 
aspects. Despite the substantial number of control dummies, coefficients are well behaved with 
variance inflation factors below 5, which shows that there is enough variation in takeover law 
to be exploited by our models. At the same time, country and time dummies purge variation 
unrelated to takeover law, which may improve estimation accuracy. The magnitude of the 
takeover law effect remains substantial and significant even if year or country dummies or both 
are excluded (not tabulated) or when heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are used. As 
expected, adjusted R-squared drops from 13.8 percent to 8.3 percent if all country and year 
dummies are excluded.  
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
As to the control variables, we observe some interesting findings. Specifically, the results 
show that the run-up CAR significantly increases the takeover premium. A cumulative pre-
announcement return of ten percent increases the premium offered by the bidder by 1.7 percent. 
This is in contrast to Bauguess et al. (2009) whose findings suggest an insignificantly negative 
effect of run-up CAR on the takeover premium paid to target shareholders. Our results could, 
therefore, support Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), King and Padalko (2005) and Schwert (1996) 
who suggest target pre-announcement run-up stock price could reflect positive public 
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information about the takeovers and an increase in the target’s stand-alone value. Consistent 
with Martynova and Renneboog (2008b) and Alexandridis et al. (2012), we find that hostile 
takeovers yield much higher premiums than friendly transactions. One explanation for this 
finding is that hostile offers are much less likely to proceed, hence bidding companies are 
prepared to pay higher premiums to target shareholders in order to proceed with takeover bids. 
We will further explore this explanation in regressions of takeover success in Table 7. Cash-
only offers are surprisingly unrelated to premiums, although equity payment is usually 
considered a transaction payment method inferior to cash offers (Jensen, 1986; Mitchell et al, 
2004; Martynova and Renneboog, 2008b; Bauguess et al., 2009). However, we find evidence 
for a positive efficiency effect of cash transactions in combined target-bidder announcement 
returns, as reported in Table 10 below. Finally, takeovers in which bidders diversify into an 
industry unrelated to their core business yield smaller premiums. These could be related to 
smaller gains expected by bidders when entering new industries.  
5.2 Takeover law provisions and offer premiums 
A natural question to ask is what matters in takeover law? Models 2 to 7 in Table 5 try to answer 
this question by analyzing the effect of individual takeover law provisions. Among the six 
takeover law provisions, ownership disclosure is the first single takeover law provision in place 
in most EU countries, followed by the mandatory bid rule.16 The general trend is that the 
squeeze-out rule, the sell-out rule and the management neutrality rule are introduced at a 
relative late stage, that is, most nations implement these three provisions during the late 1990s. 
With the development of takeover law, by the year 2010 most countries have the ownership 
                                               
16 The statistics of the takeover law provisions, not reported, show that 44% of the EU countries have the ownership 
disclosure provision as their first single takeover regulation. If we consider a joint implementation of ownership 
disclosure as their first takeover rule, this number rises to 88%. Furthermore, we find that, though only 6% of the 
EU countries implement mandatory bid rule provision as their first single takeover rule, the joint implementation 
of mandatory bid rule is 44%.  
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disclosure, the mandatory bid rule and the fair price rule in place while some countries still have 
not implemented the squeeze-out rights rule, the sell-out rights rule and the management 
neutrality rule in their takeover regulation. Therefore, our sequence of model is built upon the 
general time order of takeover provisions as introduced in practice in order to investigate their 
combined economic implications, as reported in Table 5 (models 2 to 7).  
The results for individual provisions in Table 5 reflect that the effect of the mandatory bid 
rule is significant and substantial. Interestingly, ownership disclosure does not increase offer 
premiums, although the estimated coefficient is substantial. The insignificant coefficient seems 
not to be due to this provision’s coding, as the effect is still insignificant if coded as a simple 
indicator for the presence or absence of a disclosure rule, regardless of its threshold. 
The mandatory bid rule gives the minority shareholders an opportunity to exit the company 
in the case of a takeover. Consistent with our expectation, the result provides strong evidence 
that the mandatory bid rule has a significant and positive impact on the takeover premium. In 
terms of the economic significance, the takeover premium paid to the target shareholders would 
be 24 percent higher when there is a mandatory bid rule. Our finding is in contrast to the 
negative effect of the mandatory bid rule on takeover premiums found by Rossi and Volpin 
(2004) because they use the mandatory bid rule in 1995 in their study, which cannot distinguish 
true differences between countries from the reform of takeover law over time. Therefore, we 
contribute to the extant literature by providing timely empirical evidence that the mandatory 
bid rule protects the minority shareholders in a takeover bid as predicted theoretically by 
Bebchuk (1994), Macey et al. (1995), Skog (1997), Bergström and Högfeldt (1997), Burkart 
(1999), Ferrarini (2000), Berglöf et al. (2003), Goergen et al. (2005), and Ferrarini and Miller 
(2010).  
When we add in the fair price rule in model 4, the effect of the mandatory bid rule increases 
by 4 percentage points if the ownership disclosure rule, the mandatory bid rule and the fair price 
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for minority provision are included. The fair price rule is often introduced in combination with 
a mandatory bid rule, as its aim is to protect minority shareholders in a takeover bid. However, 
we find a negative effect of the fair price rule on takeover premium, but it is statistically 
insignificant.  
Models 5 and 6 examine the impact of squeeze-out rights and sell-out rights on the takeover 
premium. The squeeze-out rights rule aims to allow the majority shareholders to squeeze out 
the minority shareholders and mitigate the free-rider problem (Yarrow, 1985); therefore, we 
expect a negative relationship between the squeeze-out rights rule and the takeover premium. 
The coefficient of the squeeze-out rights rule is negative, but it is far from statistically 
significant. This result suggests that bidders see the possibility of a squeeze-out as a neutral 
with respect to the costs of a takeover. The sell-out rights rule, on the other hand, reduces the 
pressure of the minority shareholders to tender and gives the minority shareholders the right to 
exit the company before the bidders take full control of the company (Burkart and Panunzi, 
2003). We may therefore expect a positive relationship between the sell-out rights rule and the 
takeover premium. The results show an insignificant but negative effect of sell-out rights on 
premiums. In summary, the squeeze-out and sell-out rules may lead to transfers of wealth 
between tendering and non-tendering target shareholders, which leave the total cost to bidders 
unaffected.  
We explore the combined effect of all six takeover law provisions in model 7 in table 5. 
The mandatory bid rule significantly dominates all other takeover provisions with a substantial 
and economically positive effect. More specifically, takeover premiums would be 53 percent 
higher under the mandatory bid rule, which is much higher than the corresponding coefficient 
in model 3 which includes the ownership disclosure rule and the mandatory bid rule. The effect 
of the squeeze-out rights rule is negative as expected, but still insignificant. Similarly, both fair-
price rule and sell-out rights seem to be more costly for bidders and decrease premiums in a 
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simultaneous setting, but remain insignificant. The management neutrality rule, however, 
seems to work in favor of target shareholder in encouraging higher offers from bidders. The 
effect is substantial, but insignificant, potentially because the management neutrality rule 
effectively reduces the potential agency problems in a takeover bid (Bebchuk, 2002; McCahery 
et al., 2003; Goergen et al., 2005) or due to limited historical data considering the relatively late 
introduction of managerial neutrality into national takeover law.  
5.3 Do higher offer premiums mean higher returns to shareholders? 
Premiums offered by bidders in takeovers should have a proportional effect on expected wealth 
gains to target shareholders as measured by excess stock returns around the day the takeover is 
announced. In principle, a higher price offered to target shareholders will correspond to a higher 
gain only if the offer is not withdrawn due to, for example, external factors or anti-takeover 
action by the target’s management. Conversely, final gains to target shareholders may be higher 
than the original offer price if the bidder is forced to enhance the offer during the takeover 
negotiation process. By comparing announcement returns and premiums, we obtain insights 
into the importance of takeover law for actual wealth gains and the expected success 
probabilities of takeovers. We test the empirical relationship between offer premiums and 
shareholder wealth gains by estimating the impact of takeover law on announcement returns in 
Table 6 and takeover success in Table 7. 
A path from takeover law to improved takeover premiums to higher announcement returns 
is difficult to establish if we compare the effect of takeover law on both outcome variables. We 
find that the coefficient of takeover law index on target announcement returns is reduced to 
4.215 from its effect of 7.308 on takeover premium, but remains significant at the one-percent 
level. The decreased coefficient suggests that a large proportion of the total effect on CARs 
indirectly results from higher takeover premiums. 
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When investigating the relevance of takeover law, it is instructive to identify the 
heterogeneous impact of takeover law provisions on target announcement returns. On the one 
hand, and in the light of its effect on takeover premiums, the ownership disclosure rule 
significantly increases expected target CARs while the mandatory bid rule is insignificant in 
the model for target CARs. On the other hand, in a simultaneous setting, rules that increase 
takeover premiums do not at the same time increase announcement returns for target 
shareholders. While the mandatory bid rule is the only provision significantly explaining 
takeover premiums in a model using all six provisions simultaneously, it gives way to the 
ownership disclosure rule when explaining target CARs, which significantly increases target 
CARs by 17 percentage points.  
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
If higher premiums do not proportionately increase announcement returns, a difference in 
the probability for a successful takeover might be the reason for a differential effect of certain 
rules on premiums and returns. This theory receives no support in our findings in Table 7.  
Effects on the likelihood of a successful takeover are insignificant for the set of rules that 
increase premiums or returns. This finding suggests that higher premiums translate directly into 
wealth gains for target shareholders without takeover provisions moderating the likelihood of 
a successful takeover. On the other hand, we find a slightly significant increase in the likelihood 
of success for takeovers under the sell-out rule, which should lead to higher announcement 
returns in takeovers announced under this rule. Since there is not such effect, we suspect that 
the binary nature of our Probit regressions for takeover success leads to high estimation 
uncertainty and imprecise coefficients in either the models for takeover premiums or models 
for announcement returns. 
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[Table 7 about here] 
 
The findings in Table 6 suggest that a large proportion of the total effect on CARs could 
indirectly result from higher takeover premiums. To gain further insight into the relationship 
between takeover law, takeover premiums and target CARs, we perform a mediation test for 
takeover premiums. Our findings in Table 8 indicate that takeover law acts on target 
announcement returns through the offer premium. The competing hypothesis is that takeover 
law acts directly on target CARs. The takeover index satisfies the relevance criterion by 
significantly predicting offer premiums, as we have shown in Table 8. Premiums in turn predict 
announcement returns, with the strongest effect on target CARs as expected and weaker effects 
on bidder CARs and weighted CARs. Sobel mediation tests are significant for target and 
weighted CARs, but not for bidder CARs. This confirms the expectation that takeover law 
increases announcement returns mainly through its effect on offer premiums. Interestingly, 
takeover law also seems to have a direct effect on weighted and bidder CARs. Despite the 
reduced sample size compared with our main models due to missing values in the offer 
premium, the effect of takeover law on weighted CARs is significant at the 5-percent level and 
its effect on bidder CARs is significant at the 10-percent level. 
 
[Table 8 about here] 
 
Control variables paint a similar picture of the relationship between takeover premiums, 
takeover probability and target announcement returns. Target size and Tobin’s Q of the target 
predict both premiums and announcement returns with a corresponding absence of an impact 
on takeover success as in the case of takeover provisions. Announcement return and premiums 
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are much higher in hostile takeovers than in friendly transactions, but this effect is less 
pronounced for announcement returns. This finding is consistent with the results that hostile 
takeovers are also much less likely to succeed, reducing the expected gain for target 
shareholders given the premium offered. Diversification and run-up do not significant increase 
CARs, while the bidder’s toehold significantly reduces CARs to target shareholders. In 
addition, takeovers with larger bidders and bidders with a higher cash flow tend to increase 
expected returns for target shareholders. This might be the results of takeovers being more 
successful with these bidders. We find partial support for this hypothesis: there is a higher 
likelihood of a successful takeover for larger bidders, but cash flow is not significant in Table 7. 
5.4 Returns to bidders and total wealth effects 
As the results thus far demonstrate that takeover law protects minority shareholders in target 
firms, this section addresses the question whether target shareholders gain at the expense of 
bidders, that is, whether stricter takeover law significantly reduces the returns to the bidders in 
a takeover bid. We further explore whether higher expected returns may be derived from more 
efficient takeover regulations, corresponding to a net social welfare gain that is shared between 
targets and bidders. 
We start our analysis by investigating the effect of takeover law on the announcement 
CARs to bidders, followed by examining the effect of individual takeover law provisions. The 
evidence in Table 9 suggests that the effect of takeover law on bidders’ CARs is insignificant, 
even after controlling for the other potential factors which might affect the returns to the 
bidders. In terms of the effect of takeover law provisions, the squeeze-out rights rule gives 
majority shareholders the right to squeeze out the minority shareholders in order to mitigate the 
free-rider problem (Yarrow, 1985). Hence, we expect a positive relationship between the 
squeeze-out rights rule and bidders’ CARs. Interestingly, the results show a statistically 
insignificant but negative effect on bidder’s CARs.  
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 [Table 9 about here] 
 
Bebchuk (1994) argues that, by setting a lower threshold of the mandatory bid rule, it 
makes the transactions more expensive to acquiring firms. Goergen et al. (2005) maintain that 
the sell-out rights rule could reduce the gains to bidding firms because it reduces the pressure 
of the minority shareholders to tender and provides them the right to exit the company before 
the bidders take full control of the company. In addition, stricter takeover law could result in a 
wealth transfer from bidders to targets, because most of the gains are “free-riding” by the target 
shareholders (Grossman and Hart, 1980). However, we find there is no significant effect of 
these takeover law provisions on bidder’s announcement returns.  
To summarize, in contrast to these arguments and to our hypothesis, the results suggest 
that stricter takeover law does not hurt bidders in practice. In other words, takeover laws 
function well in respect to the wealth distribution of targets and bidders in a takeover bid.  
To measure the overall wealth effects from takeover regulation, we calculate the combined 
target and acquirer announcement returns, weighted by market capitalization. This procedure 
assumes that social welfare gains are reflected by expected announcement returns to rational, 
unbiased residual claimants in takeovers, ignoring other potential stakeholders, such as bond 
holders, or external effects on the public.17 
Our results show that total wealth effects increase in takeovers announced in country-years 
with a stricter takeover law, as shown in Table 10. This combined wealth effect of increased 
weighted announcement returns for targets and bidders is associated with the ownership 
                                               
17 The complexities of takeovers in practice have been recognized among practitioners and academics. Using share 
price information to measure the wealth effect of takeovers is one of the most widely used methods among scholars 
(Cuñat et al., 2012; Sokolyk, 2011; Giroud and Mueller, 2010; Schouten and Siems, 2010; Bris and Cabolis, 2008; 
Martynova and Renneboog, 2008b; Armour et al., 2007; Faleye, 2007; Wald and Long, 2007; Rossi and Volpin, 
2004; Daines, 2001; Garvey and Hanka, 1999; Comment and Schwert, 1995). 
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disclosure rule and – to a lesser extent – with the mandatory bid rule. Regulation that was 
introduced later in time, such as squeeze-out or sell-out rights, has no detectable effect on total 
shareholders’ wealth. Government regulation of takeovers may exhibit decreasing returns 
which become more difficult to detect if more rules are added to an existing regulatory 
framework. We test this hypothesis by including the square of the takeover law index. Effects 
on our dependent variables are all insignificant,18 but coefficients on the squared term are 
negative for target, bidder and weighted announcement returns as is expected under decreasing 
returns to regulation. 
 
[Table 10 about here] 
 
 
The results are consistent with our hypothesis that a stricter takeover law increases 
shareholder wealth for the combined firm. In other words, stricter takeover laws succeed in 
protecting the welfare of minority shareholders and promoting the efficient allocation of 
productive resources. Our finding contributes to the extant literature (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; 
Moeller et al., 2004; Bauguess et al., 2009) by providing empirical evidence that a stricter 
takeover law is an important determinant to the positive and significant weighted announcement 
returns to bidders and targets. In addition, we document both direct and indirect effects of 
takeover law on combined shareholder wealth. Table 8 shows that offer premiums mediate the 
effect of takeover law and in turn act on announcement returns. However, we also detect direct 
and positive effects on bidder announcement returns and combined wealth.  
 
 
                                               
18 Results are available from the authors on request. 
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6. ROBUSTNESS 
6.1 Investor protection 
The seminal work of La Porta et al. (1998) has highlighted the importance of investor protection 
for corporate finance. Recently, the effect of investor protection laws on mergers and 
acquisitions has been examined (Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Starks and Wei, 2004; Bris and 
Cabolis, 2008; Martynova and Renneboog, 2008b; Kuipers et al., 2009; Danbolt and Maciver, 
2012). Other literature has examined wealth effects in mergers and acquisitions across countries 
and over time as well as in relation to the acquirer’s and target’s attributes such as corporate 
governance (Harford et al., 2012; Bhagat et al., 2005). To verify the contribution of this paper, 
we test whether existing investor protection indices are able to capture a similar degree of 
variation in premiums and announcement returns as the takeover index we construct. 
As a robustness test, we employ the shareholder rights index and the creditor rights index 
from Martynova and Renneboog (2011a). The shareholder rights index measures the level of 
protection for the shareholders against managerial opportunistic behaviour, while the creditor 
rights index measures the protection given to creditors in the case of bankruptcy. Neither of 
these two indices is able to significantly explain announcement returns if added to model 1 in 
Tables 6, 9 and 10. Both indices are significant, but statistically weaker than the takeover law 
index, in regressions of takeover premiums. Shareholder protection contributed positively to 
premiums, while higher creditor protection reduces premiums offered by bidders. Our takeover 
index may be better able to explain expected returns as it reflects the actual takeover process 
than broad investor protection indices. 
6.2 The total wealth effects of takeover law for non-UK targets 
Table 10 shows that the overall wealth effect of a stricter takeover law on the weighted 
announcement returns of bidders and targets is positive and significant. However, Figure 1 may 
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draw our attention to a specific feature of the development of takeover law in the UK. Amongst 
the sixteen major European countries, a high and constant level of protection for the minority 
shareholders (measured by the mean value of the takeover law index) is provided by the UK. 
Since our identification strategy is relies on country-year variation, one might suspect that the 
results are driven by the takeover law in the UK or the dominance of the UK targets in our 
dataset. 
 
[Table 11 about here] 
 
 
Table 11 reports the total wealth effects of takeover law for non-UK targets. It is interesting 
to find that the wealth effect of a stricter takeover law is statistically significant and 
economically larger when we exclude the UK targets in our analysis. Consistent with the 
findings in Table 10, the ownership disclosure rule and the mandatory bid rule increase the total 
wealth of the combined company. Notably, the wealth effects of both provisions are 
significantly higher when we exclude the UK targets. The coefficient of the ownership 
disclosure rule increases from 7 percentage points in Table 10 to 15 percentage points in Table 
11, while the coefficient of the mandatory bid rule rises from 6 percentage points in Table 10 
to 10 percentage points in Table 11. The results are consistent with our hypothesis and, to some 
extent, reduce our concern about a potential degree of correlation between country effects, time 
effects and takeover law. Identification of economic effects for the non-UK targets validates 
our findings, since there is sufficient country-year variation that is not already captured by 
country or year effects alone. Therefore, our dataset can identify the effects we hypothesize, 
but we would encourage future research to build upon our results.  
Table 11 further reveals some interesting findings regarding the other takeover law 
provisions. Table 10 reports insignificant but negative coefficient for the fair price rule and the 
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squeeze-out rights rule, while Table 11 shows that, excluding the UK targets, the fair price rule 
and the squeeze-out rights rule significantly reduce the total gain of the bidders and targets. In 
this context, the fair price rule reduces the weighted announcement returns by 6 percentage 
points, whilst the gain enjoyed by the combined company decreases by 4 percentage points. In 
other words, our results suggest that the fair price rule and the squeeze-out rights rule make the 
takeovers more expensive for bidders. 
7. CONCLUSION 
The debate concerning an appropriate takeover regulation has been ongoing since the late 
1960s, when U.S. and the U.K. simultaneously introduced their first takeover laws. In the 
following four decades, policymakers and regulators have aimed to provide a takeover law that 
protects shareholders in a takeover bid whilst facilitating the market for corporate control and 
maintaining the integrity of financial markets. This study contributes to the extant literature 
(Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Moeller et al., 2004; Bauguess et al., 2009) on takeovers by 
investigating the development of takeover laws in European countries and demonstrating that 
takeover law plays an important role in determining wealth gains and transfers in acquisitions. 
To capture the quality of a takeover law in a given country, we construct a sensitive and rich 
takeover law index in a time-varying form for 16 European countries over the last 25 years. In 
particular, the takeover law index considers six key takeover law provisions, namely, ownership 
disclosure, mandatory bid rule, fair price for the minority shareholders, squeeze-out rights, sell-
out rights and management neutrality. The wealth effects of takeover law are examined using 
takeovers in European countries in the period 1986–2010. 
There are three main conclusions emerging from this study. First, the dynamic takeover 
law index reflects how takeover laws have substantially improved over the last 25 years in the 
EU. Second, this study provides strong evidence that stricter takeover law protects the rights of 
the minority shareholders in target firms in the case of a takeover bid, as the effect of takeover 
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law on the takeover premium and announcement returns is positive, statistically significant and 
economically large. This result seems to be driven by the mandatory bid rule and the ownership 
disclosure rule. Third, we find that stricter takeover law does not reduce the announcement 
CARs to the bidders and increases the combined expected gains from takeovers for targets and 
bidders. Our results suggest that the ownership disclosure rule and the mandatory bid rule 
increase the total gain enjoyed by the combined company, while the fair-price-to-minority rule 
and the squeeze-out rights rule may make the takeovers costly and reduce the total wealth for 
bidders and target. Since an estimation of takeover frequency is beyond the scope of this paper, 
future research may complete the picture and investigate whether a stricter takeover law 
discourages bids and whether this reduces the overall beneficial effect of takeover regulation 
that we find. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix A: Variable Definitions  
Variable Definition 
Age Age, in the logarithm, is the number of years on the day of the announcement since the firm was 
first covered by the Stock Exchange in a given country. Source: Datastream and Worldscope.  
Bidder CARs Bidder CARs are the announcement cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the bidding firms, 
calculated as the CARs of the bidding firms over the event window [-2, +2] around the takeover 
announcement, where day 0 is the announcement date. The abnormal returns are calculated using 
the market model, where the market index is the local index or MSCI World index. Parameters 
of the market model are estimated over the period of 260 to 43 trading days prior to the takeover 
announcement. Source: Datastream. 
Cash Flow Cash flow ratio is calculated as the cash flow from operations over the total assets at the end of 
fiscal year before the takeover announcement. Source: Datastream and Worldscope.  
Cash-only 
Transaction  
A dummy variable takes a value of one if the takeover is fully paid with cash, and is zero 
otherwise. Source: Thomson Financial, LexisNexis, and Financial Times. 
Diversification A dummy variable takes a value of one if the target and the acquirer operate in different industries 
(the primary 2-digit SIC codes are different), and is zero otherwise. Source: Thomson Financial, 
LexisNexis, Financial Times and Worldscope. 
Financial Distress  A dummy variable equals one if net income of the target firm is zero or negative in the year 
preceding the announcement of the deal, and is zero otherwise. Source: Datastream and 
Worldscope. 
Hostile Hostile is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the target management reacts negatively 
to the initial takeover offer but the bidder persists with the takeover. Source: Thomson Financial, 
LexisNexis, and Financial Times. 
Leverage Leverage ratio is calculated as the total debt (long-term and short-term) to the total assets over 
the fiscal year prior to the takeover announcement. Source: Datastream and Worldscope.  
Run-up CAR Run-up CAR is calculated as the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the firms over the 
window [-43, -2] prior to the takeover announcement, where day 0 is the announcement date and 
days are measured in trading days relative to the announcement date. The abnormal returns are 
calculated using the market model, where the market index is the local index or MSCI World if 
a local market index is not available. Parameters of the market model are estimated over the 
period of 260 to 43 trading days prior to the takeover announcement. Source: Datastream. 
Takeover Law 
Index 
The takeover law index measures the quality of takeover law in a given country. It takes the 
value of the accumulation of six variables, as defined in Table 2: (1) ownership disclosure, (2) 
mandatory bid, (3) fair price for the minority shareholders, (4) squeeze-out rights; (5) sell-out 
rights; and (6) management neutrality. The index ranges from minus one to five. A higher value 
indicates a stricter takeover law. Source: Country's Takeover Law and Regulation, Companies 
Law, Securities Laws, and Stock Exchange Regulation. Own construction. 
Takeover Premium The takeover premium is calculated as the ratio of offer price to target closing stock price 1 day 
prior to the original announcement date, minus one, expressed as a percentage: (offer price / 
share price at t-1 – 1) x 100. Source: Thomson Financial, LexisNexis, Financial Times, and 
Datastream. 
Tobin's Q Tobin's Q is calculated as the market value of the total assets divided by the book value of the 
total assets, where the market value of the total assets is equal to the market value of equity plus 
the book value of total debt. The market value of equity is the value two months prior to the 
takeover announcement, book value of total assets and total debt are the values at the fiscal year 
end prior to the takeover announcement. Source: Datastream and Worldscope. 
Toehold Toehold is the percentage of the target shares that the bidder owns in the target firms prior to the 
takeover announcement. Source: Thomson Financial, LexisNexis, and Financial Times. 
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Appendix B: Sources of the Takeover Law Index for European Countries, 1986–2010 
Country  Sources 
Austria   Companies Act 1965; Stock Exchange Act of 1989; Takeover Law 1998; Stock Exchange Act of 1989 
as amended on June 26, 2006; Takeover Law 2006. Current regulator: Vienna Stock Exchange, 
Austrian Financial Market Authority, Takeover Commission. 
Belgium   The Law of 2 March 1989; Takeover Decree 1989; Companies Act 1995; Takeover Act 2007; 
Takeover Decree 2007; Transparency Law 2007. Current regulator: The Belgian Banking, Finance 
and Insurance Commission (CBFA). 
Czech 
Republic   
Civil Code 1963; Commercial Code 1991; Commercial Code 1996; Commercial Code 2000; Capital 
Market Act 2004; Takeover Law 2008. Current regulator: The Czech National Bank (CNB). 
Denmark   Companies Act 1985; Code of Ethics 1987; Securities Trading Act 1995; Securities Trading Act 1999; 
Order on Takeover Bids 2005; Takeover Act 2006; Companies Act 2006; Securities Trading Act 2008; 
Companies Act 2009. Current regulator: the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA). 
Finland   Companies Act 1978; Securities Market Act 1989; Securities Market Act 1993; Companies Act 1997; 
Securities Market Act 1999; Securities Market Act 2006; Companies Act 2006. Current regulator: 
Finnish Financial Supervision Authority (FSA). 
France   Act on Commercial Companies 1966; SEC Decision 1981, Act related to Stock Companies Interests 
1985; Act on Commercial Companies 1985; Act on Savings 1987; Financial Market Act 1989; Stock 
Exchange Order on Takeover Bids 1992; Act on Commercial Companies 2000; Commercial Code 
2000; Takeover Act 2006; Order of AMF 2006. Current regulator: Authority of Financial markets 
(AMF). 
Germany   Companies Act 1965; Securities Trading Act 1994; Takeover Code 1995; Takeover Act 2001; 
Takeover Offer Regulation 2001; Takeover Act 2006; Transparency Directive Implementation Act 
2007. Current Regulator: Federal Financial (BaFin). 
Greece   Companies Act 1920; Decree on Information Disclosure 1992; Stock Exchange Decision 2000; 
Takeover Decision 2002; Takeover Act 2006; Transparency Law 2007. Current Regulator: The 
Hellenic Capital Markets Commission (CMC). 
Ireland Companies Act 1963; the UK takeover law index for the period 1986-1996; Companies Act 1990; 
Takeover Act 1997; Takeover Regulations 2006; Transparency Regulation 2007; Takeover Rules 
2007; Transparency Rules 2009. Current regulator: The Irish Takeover Panel. 
Italy   Securities Market Law 1974; Public Offer Regulation 1992; Financial Act 1998; Amendment of 
Consolidated Financial Act 2007. Current regulator: National Commission for Companies and Stock 
Exchange (CONSOB). 
Luxembourg Companies Act 1915; Companies Act 1987; Law on Information Disclosure in a Listed Company 
1992; Takeover Act 2006; Transparency law 2008. Current regulator: Luxembourg Financial Services 
Authority (CSSF). 
Netherlands   Civil Code Book 2 1958; Amendment of regulating the transfer of shares in Civil Code Book 2 1988-
1989; Introducing buy-out minority interests in Civil Code Book 2 1984-1985; Disclosure Act 1992; 
Disclosure Act 1996; Disclosure Act 2006; Financial Supervision Act 2006; Takeover Act 2007. 
Current regulator: The Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM). 
Portugal Commercial Code 1986; Securities Market Code 1991; Securities Market Code 1995; Securities 
Market Code 1999; Securities Market Code 2006. Current regulator: Portuguese Securities Market 
Commission (CMVM). 
Spain   Takeover Decree 1980; Securities Market Act 1988; Act on Public Bid 1991; Securities Market Act 
2007; Takeover Decree 2007, Transparency Act 2007. Current regulator: National Securities Market 
Commission (CNMV). 
Sweden   NBK Recommendations 1971; Act on Acquisitions 1982; Securities Market Act 1985; Securities 
Council Statement 1986; Financial Instruments Trading Act 1991;  NBK Recommendations 1994;
NBK Recommendations 1999, NBK Rules 2003; Companies Act 2005; Takeover Rules 2006; 
Takeover Act 2006. Current regulator: The Swedish Industry and Commerce Stock Exchange 
Committee (NBK), the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA). 
United 
Kingdom   
Companies Act 1985; Takeover Code 1985; Companies Act 1989; Takeover Code 2006, Companies 
Act 2006. Current regulator: The UK Panel on Takeovers and Mergers (the Panel). 
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FIGURES AND TABLES 
 
 
Figure 1. Takeover law index for European countries, 1986-2010 
This figure reports, in alphabetical order, the takeover law index for the major European countries during 1986-2010. The 
takeover law index measures the quality of takeover law in a given country. It takes the value of the accumulation of six 
variables, as defined in Table 2: (1) ownership disclosure, (2) mandatory bid, (3) fair price for the minority shareholders, (4) 
squeeze-out rights (negatively coded); (5) sell-out rights; and (6) management neutrality. Theoretically possible index values 
are in the range [-1, 5]. A higher value indicates a takeover law more favourable for target shareholders. Source: Country's 
Takeover Law and Regulation, Companies Law, Securities Laws, and Stock Exchange Regulation; own construction. Lines 
are slightly offset from their actual values by at most 0.05 to help distinguish lines that would otherwise overlap. 
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Table 1. Summary of main findings 
This table summarises our findings for takeover premiums (column “Premium”), announcement returns for target shares 
(“Target CAR”), announcement returns for acquirers (“Bidder CAR”), weighted target-acquirer announcement returns 
(“Weighted CAR”) and likelihood of observing a successful takeover (“Success”) in simultaneous (“Simult.”) and separate 
(Indiv.”) regressions. Plus and minus signs indicate the coefficient’s direction, while their number indicates significance: 
+++, ++, + stand for 1%, 5% and 10% significance, respectively, and likewise for negative coefficients. 
 Premium Target CAR Bidder CAR 
 Indiv. Simult. Indiv. Simult. Indiv. Simult. 
Takeover index ++ n/a +++ n/a  n/a 
Ownership disclosure   ++ +   
Mandatory bid +++ +++ ++    
Fair price for minority       
Squeeze-out right   –    
Sell-out rights       
Management neutrality       
 Weighted CAR 
Weighted CAR 
(excl. U.K.) 
 
Success 
 Indiv. Simult. Indiv. Simult. Indiv. Simult. 
Takeover index + n/a ++ n/a  n/a 
Ownership disclosure ++ ++ +++ +++   
Mandatory bid ++ ++ +++ +++   
Fair price for minority   – – –   
Squeeze-out right   – –   
Sell-out rights     +  
Management neutrality       
 
 
 
Table 2. Coding of takeover law provisions and the impact of takeover law provisions 
This table defines the coding of the components of the takeover law index used in this study. 
Variable Definition 
Ownership disclosure Equals 1 if the shareholders who acquire at least 3% of the company's capital have to 
disclose it; equals 0.75 if this concerns 5% of the capital; equals 0.5 if this concerns 
10%; equals 0.25 if this concerns 25%; otherwise zero. 
Mandatory bid Equals 1 if there is a mandatory public bid for the entirety of shares in case of purchase 
of 30% or 1/3 of the shares; equals 0.5 if a mandatory bid is triggered at a higher 
percentage (such as 40 or 50 %); equals 0.5 if there is a mandatory bid rule but no 
specific percentage required; further, it equals 0.5 if there is a mandatory bid but 
the bidder is only required to buy part of the shares; and equals zero if there is no 
mandatory bid at all. 
Fair price for the 
minority shareholders 
Equals 1 if the mandatory offer is restricted by law to offer some measures of a market 
price (usually an average price paid for the same securities over a period in the 
prior six to twelve months); and zero otherwise. 
Squeeze-out rights Equals 1 if the majority shareholders can squeeze the minority shareholders out at a 
certain level of ownership (usually 90% or more); and zero otherwise. 
Sell-out rights Equals 1 if the minority shareholders can require the majority owner to buy them out at 
a certain level of ownership (usually 90% or more); and zero otherwise. 
Management neutrality Equals 1 if there is a strict obligation to apply the management neutrality rule in the 
regulation, 0.5 if there is a management neutrality rule but subject to the reciprocity 
rule, and zero otherwise. 
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Table 3. Implementation effect of the EU Directive on the takeover law index and takeover law provisions  
This table reports the implementation effect of the EU Directive on the takeover law index and takeover law provisions for the major European countries involving in cross-border 
takeovers in European countries during 1986–2010. Implemetation date is the date that member nations implement the Directive into their national takeover law. The effect of the 
Directive on takeover law provision takes a value of one if that provision in the member nation must be raised to a higher level to satisfy the minimum standard of the Directive, and 
zero if that provision remains unchanged or has a higher level than the Directive before the implementation date. The effect of the Directive on the takeover law index takes the value 
of the average of the effect of the Directive on takeover law provisions. The last column is the number of takeovers in the samples affected by the implementation of the Directive. 
  Implementation date 
Effect on 
ownership 
disclosure 
Effect on 
mandatory bid 
Effect on 
fair price 
 
Effect on 
squeeze-out 
Effect on  
sell-out 
Effect on 
management 
neutrality 
Average effect on 
the takeover law 
index 
No. of takeovers in the 
samples affected by the 
Directive 
Austria 20/05/2006 0 1 0 1 0 0 0.33 2 
Belgium 01/04/2007 0 1 0 0 1 0 0.33 8 
Czech Rep. 01/04/2008 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.33 1 
Denmark 20/05/2006 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.17 4 
Finland 08/06/2006 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.17 4 
France 20/05/2006 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.17 21 
Germany 08/07/2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 0 
Greece 30/05/2006 0 1 0 1 1 0 0.50 3 
Ireland 20/05/2006 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.17 3 
Italy 19/11/2007 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.33 2 
Luxembourg 20/05/2006 0 1 1 1 1 1 0.83 0 
Netherlands 24/05/2007 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.17 11 
Portugal 02/11/2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 0 
Spain 13/04/2007 1 1 0 1 1 0 0.67 2 
Sweden 07/06/2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 0 
UK 20/05/2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 0 
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Table 4. Summary statistics 
This table reports descriptive statistics for attempted takeovers involving public acquirers and public targets in European 
countries during 1986-2010. Firm accounting figures are based on the fiscal year data before the takeover announcement. For 
dummy variables, only the proportion of deals with the relevant attribute is shown in the “mean” column and other summary 
statistics are omitted. Significance levels for dependent variables: ***, **, * stand for 1%, 5% and 10% significance. 
Variable N Mean Median SD Min. Max. 
Dependent variables 
Offer premium 1027 30.938*** 26.450 36.699 -72.448 225.015
Target CAR [-2,2] 1273 17.338*** 12.462 21.512 -37.440 108.239
Bidder CAR [-2,2] 1241 -0.594*** -0.524 7.775 -31.533 25.246
Weighted CAR [-2,2] 1240 2.333*** 1.657 7.911 -27.061 34.341
Successful takeover 1273 0.807 
Takeover law variables 
Takeover index 1273 3.308  4.000 1.124 -1.000 4.000
Ownership disclosure 1273 0.884  1.000 0.155 0.000 1.000
Mandatory bid 1273 0.854  1.000 0.317 0.000 1.000
Fair price for minority 1273 0.897  
Squeeze-out right 1273 0.846  
Sell-out rights 1273 0.778  
Management neutrality 1273 0.741  1.000 0.421 0.000 1.000
Deal characteristics 
Deal value 1273 5.232  5.085 1.937 0.402 10.384
Toehold 1273 5.409  0.000 12.044 0.000 50.000
Hostile bid 1273 0.104  
Cash-only transaction 1273 0.391  
Cross-border transaction 1273 0.390  
Diversification 1273 0.443  
Target (T) and bidder (A) characteristics 
(T) CAR run-up 1273 0.089  0.053 0.258 -1.169 2.171
(T) Age 1273 13.224  9.465 10.923 0.287 45.881
(T) Total assets 1273 5.387  5.127 1.897 0.740 10.007
(T) Tobin's Q 1273 1.845  0.793 3.419 0.196 19.093
(T) Leverage 1273 0.204  0.176 0.171 0.000 0.759
(T) Cash flow 1273 0.094  0.107 0.145 -0.692 0.452
(T) Distressed 1273 0.240  
(T) High-tech dummy 1273 0.300  
(A) Age 1273 15.447  13.051 11.100 0.096 45.580
(A) Total assets 1273 6.911  6.892 2.242 1.160 11.665
(A) Cash flow 1273 0.116  0.118 0.106 -0.342 0.458
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Table 4. Summary statistics (continued) 
This table reports the number of transactions by year, country and SIC division. The sample consists of all attempted takeovers 
involving public acquirers and public targets in European countries during 1986-2010. The following abbreviations of country 
codes are used: AUT (Austria), BEL (Belgium), CZE (Czech Republic), DNK (Denmark), FIN (Finland), FRA (France), DEU 
(Germany), GRC (Greece), IRL (Republic of Ireland), ITA (Italy), LUX (Luxembourg), NLD (Netherlands), PRT (Portugal), 
ESP (Spain), SWE (Sweden), GBR (United Kingdom) for targets and bidders in EU countries and AU (Australia), CA 
(Canada), JP (Japan), NO (Norway), SZ (Switzerland), US (United States) for bidders in non-EU countries. 
Year  Nation  SIC division 
 Deals nxi  Targets Ij Bidders Iixj  Targets ij Bidders 
 N %   N % N % N %  N % 
1986 6 0.5  AUT 13 1.0  11 0.9  1 123 9.7 118 9.5 
1987 11 0.9  BEL 22 1.7  15 1.2  2 215 16.9 236 19.0 
1988 21 1.6  CZE 4 0.3  0 0  3 290 22.8 295 23.8 
1989 17 1.3  DEU 86 6.8  70 5.6  4 143 11.2 160 12.9 
1990 13 1.0  DNK 23 1.8  16 1.3  5 130 10.2 126 10.2 
1991 33 2.6  ESP 35 2.7  39 3.1  6 44 3.5 51 4.1 
1992 26 2.0  FIN 22 1.7  20 1.6  7 271 21.3 223 18.0 
1993 20 1.6  FRA 134 10.5  123 9.9  8 57 4.5 64 5.2 
1994 29 2.3  GBR 725 57.0  538 43.4    
1995 44 3.5  GRC 19 1.5  16 1.3        
1996 32 2.5  IRL 9 0.7  14 1.1        
1997 71 5.6  ITA 25 2.0  32 2.6        
1998 96 7.5  LUX 5 0.4  0 0        
1999 128 10.1  NLD 60 4.7  48 3.9        
2000 129 10.1  PRT 6 0.5  0 0        
2001 81 6.4  SWE 85 6.7  61 4.9        
2002 55 4.3  AU 0 0.0  9 0.7        
2003 59 4.6  CA 0 0.0  16 1.3        
2004 59 4.6  JP 0 0.0  8 0.6        
2005 76 6.0  NO 0 0.0  5 0.4        
2006 78 6.1  SZ 0 0.0  26 2.1        
2007 77 6.0  US 0 0.0  171 13.8        
2008 47 3.7  Other 0 0.0  35 2.8        
2009 36 2.8          
2010 29 2.3           
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Table 5. The effect of takeover law and provisions on takeover premiums 
This table reports coefficients of OLS regressions of takeovers premiums involving public acquirers and public targets in European countries in the period 1986-2010. Takeover premiums are defined 
as offered share price divided by pre-announcement share price one day prior to the announcement. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (HC3) 
are in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, **, * stand for 1%, 5% and 10% significance. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Takeover index 7.308 (2.92) **                   
Ownership disclosure    19.550 (30.69)   -1.864 (29.87)   -0.598 (30.08)   5.016 (31.03)   5.954 (30.57)   6.675 (30.74)   
Mandatory bid       23.574 (8.31) *** 27.870 (12.71) ** 40.636 (17.08) ** 51.489 (19.24) *** 52.572 (19.00) *** 
Fair price for minority          -4.926 (13.52)   -10.300 (14.20)   -9.682 (14.12)   -13.756 (16.76)   
Squeeze-out right             -12.497 (10.38)   -1.511 (12.09)   -4.884 (14.05)   
Sell-out rights                -20.200 (13.01)   -17.503 (14.89)   
Management neutrality                   10.416 (16.43)   
Deal value 7.262 (2.06) *** 7.279 (2.09) *** 7.187 (2.06) *** 7.171 (2.06) *** 7.061 (2.05) *** 7.015 (2.04) *** 7.019 (2.04) *** 
Toehold 0.005 (0.12)   -0.022 (0.12)   0.007 (0.12)   0.005 (0.12)   0.005 (0.12)   0.000 (0.12)   0.001 (0.12)   
Hostile bid 11.364 (4.62) ** 11.020 (4.62) ** 11.514 (4.64) ** 11.479 (4.66) ** 11.685 (4.64) ** 11.776 (4.65) ** 11.676 (4.70) ** 
Cash-only transaction 3.589 (2.91)   3.736 (2.91)   3.685 (2.91)   3.753 (2.94)   3.506 (2.95)   3.353 (2.96)   3.399 (2.98)   
Cross-border transaction 4.049 (2.88)   4.071 (2.88)   4.188 (2.88)   4.227 (2.87)   4.407 (2.89)   4.375 (2.90)   4.255 (2.92)   
Diversification -5.099 (2.58) ** -5.059 (2.58) * -4.966 (2.59) * -4.932 (2.58) * -5.027 (2.59) * -4.929 (2.60) * -4.908 (2.59) * 
(T) CAR run-up 17.112 (6.06) *** 17.070 (6.10) *** 17.060 (6.06) *** 17.121 (6.06) *** 17.145 (6.06) *** 16.590 (6.06) *** 16.670 (6.06) *** 
(T) Age -0.087 (0.12)   -0.066 (0.12)   -0.098 (0.12)   -0.099 (0.12)   -0.104 (0.12)   -0.114 (0.12)   -0.114 (0.12)   
(T) Total assets -8.071 (2.03) *** -8.273 (2.06) *** -7.885 (2.01) *** -7.851 (2.01) *** -7.842 (2.01) *** -7.709 (1.99) *** -7.644 (2.00) *** 
(T) Tobin's Q -2.916 (0.67) *** -2.926 (0.68) *** -2.929 (0.67) *** -2.925 (0.67) *** -2.920 (0.67) *** -2.944 (0.67) *** -2.917 (0.67) *** 
(T) Leverage 4.038 (8.59)   4.771 (8.58)   4.303 (8.56)   4.370 (8.58)   4.395 (8.59)   4.813 (8.58)   4.625 (8.64)   
(T) Cash flow -1.333 (11.76)   -1.375 (11.83)   -2.123 (11.75)   -2.371 (11.74)   -1.789 (11.81)   -2.199 (11.78)   -2.339 (11.78)   
(T) Distressed 2.282 (3.83)   2.151 (3.83)   1.871 (3.81)   1.802 (3.82)   1.691 (3.81)   1.266 (3.79)   1.376 (3.82)   
(A) Age -0.026 (0.11)   -0.002 (0.11)   -0.035 (0.11)   -0.035 (0.11)   -0.033 (0.11)   -0.038 (0.11)   -0.041 (0.11)   
(A) Total assets 0.806 (0.84)   0.799 (0.84)   0.773 (0.84)   0.762 (0.84)   0.831 (0.83)   0.778 (0.83)   0.756 (0.83)   
(A) Cash flow -0.050 (15.34)   1.044 (15.43)   -0.102 (15.20)   0.072 (15.11)   0.043 (15.02)   0.923 (14.83)   1.403 (14.90)   
Target country dummies Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Industry dummies Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Year dummies Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Observations 1026   1026   1026   1026   1026   1026   1026   
R-squared (adj.) 0.139   0.131   0.141   0.141   0.142   0.144   0.139   
F-statistic 3.363   3.216   3.377   3.330   3.317   3.330   3.363   
P-value 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   
 
  
49 
 
Table 6. The effect of takeover law and provisions on target announcement returns 
This table reports coefficients of OLS regressions of announcement returns to target shareholders, that is, cumulative abnormal returns in a window of [-2,2] trading days around the takeover 
announcement. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (HC3) are in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, **, * stand for 1%, 5% and 10% significance. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Takeover index 4.215 (1.14) ***                   
Ownership disclosure    22.817 (8.88) ** 17.242 (9.18) * 14.748 (9.58)  17.172 (9.64) * 17.208 (9.62) * 17.035 (9.61) * 
Mandatory bid       7.640 (3.17) ** 2.100 (5.86)  9.968 (8.24)  10.473 (7.97)  10.505 (7.98)  
Fair price for minority          6.287 (5.58)  3.674 (6.04)  3.700 (6.11)  1.239 (6.73)  
Squeeze-out right             -7.496 (4.33) * -6.860 (5.79)  -8.874 (6.15)  
Sell-out rights                -1.132 (5.56)  0.912 (6.10)  
Management neutrality                   7.326 (5.85)  
Deal value 0.907 (0.83)  0.866 (0.83)  0.833 (0.83)  0.868 (0.83)  0.877 (0.83)  0.874 (0.83)  0.907 (0.83)  
Toehold -0.133 (0.05) *** -0.143 (0.05) *** -0.141 (0.05) *** -0.138 (0.05) *** -0.136 (0.05) *** -0.136 (0.05) *** -0.138 (0.05) *** 
Hostile bid 6.468 (1.79) *** 6.397 (1.81) *** 6.316 (1.80) *** 6.395 (1.80) *** 6.483 (1.80) *** 6.481 (1.80) *** 6.351 (1.81) *** 
Cash-only transaction 1.899 (1.40)  1.767 (1.40)  1.877 (1.40)  1.834 (1.40)  1.701 (1.41)  1.688 (1.41)  1.729 (1.41)  
Cross-border transaction 3.253 (1.43) ** 3.524 (1.44) ** 3.512 (1.44) ** 3.411 (1.45) ** 3.495 (1.45) ** 3.502 (1.45) ** 3.484 (1.45) ** 
Diversification 0.149 (1.30)  0.171 (1.30)  0.150 (1.30)  0.140 (1.30)  0.150 (1.29)  0.156 (1.29)  0.166 (1.29)  
(T) CAR run-up -3.122 (3.23)  -2.853 (3.24)  -3.077 (3.25)  -3.154 (3.26)  -3.195 (3.24)  -3.210 (3.26)  -3.150 (3.26)  
(T) Age 0.001 (0.06)  0.011 (0.06)  -0.001 (0.06)  0.000 (0.06)  -0.003 (0.06)  -0.004 (0.06)  -0.004 (0.06)  
(T) Total assets -2.364 (0.90) *** -2.463 (0.90) *** -2.325 (0.90) ** -2.383 (0.91) *** -2.405 (0.90) *** -2.399 (0.91) *** -2.378 (0.91) *** 
(T) Tobin's Q -1.313 (0.23) *** -1.321 (0.23) *** -1.316 (0.23) *** -1.332 (0.23) *** -1.362 (0.23) *** -1.363 (0.23) *** -1.336 (0.23) *** 
(T) Leverage -4.267 (3.81)  -4.060 (3.84)  -4.144 (3.82)  -4.267 (3.84)  -4.327 (3.83)  -4.328 (3.83)  -4.362 (3.83)  
(T) Cash flow 2.131 (6.76)  1.902 (6.77)  1.622 (6.77)  2.079 (6.77)  2.243 (6.75)  2.219 (6.76)  2.047 (6.75)  
(T) Distressed -0.943 (1.86)  -1.090 (1.86)  -1.142 (1.86)  -1.002 (1.87)  -1.088 (1.87)  -1.105 (1.88)  -1.041 (1.88)  
(A) Age -0.012 (0.06)  0.003 (0.06)  -0.005 (0.06)  -0.007 (0.06)  -0.008 (0.06)  -0.008 (0.06)  -0.010 (0.06)  
(A) Total assets 1.489 (0.47) *** 1.472 (0.48) *** 1.470 (0.47) *** 1.486 (0.48) *** 1.497 (0.48) *** 1.496 (0.48) *** 1.469 (0.48) *** 
(A) Cash flow 18.739 (6.71) *** 19.622 (6.70) *** 18.987 (6.70) *** 18.739 (6.71) *** 18.764 (6.67) *** 18.795 (6.70) *** 19.216 (6.70) *** 
Target country dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 1273  1273  1273  1273  1273  1273  1273  
R-squared (adj.) 0.141  0.135  0.139  0.139  0.141  0.140  0.140  
F-statistic 3.930  3.802  3.843  3.810  3.813  3.759  3.731  
P-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
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Table 7. Likelihood of successful takeovers and the effect of takeover provisions 
This table reports coefficients of Probit regressions of the likelihood that an attempted takeover is successful as defined by Thomson Financial (SDC). Variable definitions are provided in Appendix 
A. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (HC3) are in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, **, * stand for 1%, 5% and 10% significance. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Takeover index 0.016 (0.10)                    
Ownership disclosure    -0.205 (0.80)  -0.338 (0.83)  -0.024 (0.81)  0.017 (0.80)  -0.037 (0.80)  -0.031 (0.81)  
Mandatory bid       0.181 (0.26)  0.854 (0.58)  0.979 (0.75)  0.577 (0.80)  0.564 (0.79)  
Fair price for minority          -0.783 (0.58)  -0.834 (0.63)  -0.910 (0.58)  -0.840 (0.58)  
Squeeze-out right             -0.116 (0.34)  -0.618 (0.50)  -0.565 (0.53)  
Sell-out rights                0.929 (0.56)* 0.881 (0.59)  
Management neutrality                   -0.229 (0.69)  
Deal value -0.058 (0.06)  -0.058 (0.07)  -0.059 (0.06)  -0.062 (0.07)  -0.062 (0.07)  -0.062 (0.07)  -0.063 (0.07)  
Toehold 0.005 (0.00)  0.005 (0.00)  0.005 (0.00)  0.005 (0.00)  0.005 (0.00)  0.005 (0.01)  0.005 (0.01)  
Hostile bid -1.251 (0.15)*** -1.247 (0.15) *** -1.248 (0.15) *** -1.262 (0.15)*** -1.260 (0.15)*** -1.265 (0.15)*** -1.263 (0.15)*** 
Cash-only transaction -0.183 (0.11)  -0.184 (0.11)  -0.180 (0.11)  -0.176 (0.12)  -0.179 (0.12)  -0.172 (0.12)  -0.173 (0.12)  
Cross-border transaction 0.119 (0.12)  0.116 (0.12)  0.114 (0.12)  0.132 (0.12)  0.135 (0.12)  0.136 (0.12)  0.139 (0.12)  
Diversification 0.073 (0.11)  0.075 (0.11)  0.074 (0.11)  0.077 (0.11)  0.077 (0.11)  0.069 (0.11)  0.069 (0.11)  
(T) CAR run-up 0.131 (0.20)  0.131 (0.20)  0.130 (0.20)  0.144 (0.20)  0.142 (0.20)  0.159 (0.20)  0.157 (0.20)  
(T) Age -0.002 (0.01)  -0.002 (0.01)  -0.002 (0.01)  -0.002 (0.01)  -0.002 (0.01)  -0.002 (0.01)  -0.002 (0.01)  
(T) Total assets -0.074 (0.07)  -0.075 (0.07)  -0.071 (0.07)  -0.066 (0.07)  -0.067 (0.07)  -0.069 (0.07)  -0.070 (0.07)  
(T) Tobin's Q 0.012 (0.02)  0.012 (0.02)  0.012 (0.02)  0.015 (0.02)  0.014 (0.02)  0.017 (0.02)  0.016 (0.02)  
(T) Leverage 0.038 (0.33)  0.041 (0.33)  0.039 (0.33)  0.064 (0.33)  0.066 (0.33)  0.059 (0.33)  0.060 (0.34)  
(T) Cash flow 0.012 (0.54)  0.014 (0.54)  0.013 (0.55)  -0.057 (0.54)  -0.051 (0.54)  -0.061 (0.54)  -0.056 (0.54)  
(T) Distressed 0.086 (0.14)  0.085 (0.14)  0.083 (0.14)  0.059 (0.14)  0.057 (0.14)  0.076 (0.14)  0.075 (0.14)  
(A) Age 0.003 (0.00)  0.003 (0.01)  0.003 (0.01)  0.003 (0.01)  0.003 (0.01)  0.004 (0.01)  0.004 (0.01)  
(A) Total assets 0.112 (0.04)*** 0.112 (0.04) *** 0.113 (0.04) *** 0.109 (0.04)*** 0.110 (0.04)*** 0.111 (0.04)*** 0.111 (0.04)*** 
(A) Cash flow 0.513 (0.54)  0.515 (0.54)  0.503 (0.54)  0.528 (0.55)  0.530 (0.55)  0.517 (0.55)  0.504 (0.54)  
Target country dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 1272  1272  1272  1272  1272  1272  1272  
McFadden R² (adj.) 0.079  0.079  0.078  0.079  0.078  0.080  0.079  
AIC 1152.681  1152.627  1154.161  1152.588  1154.459  1150.886  1152.687  
LR test P-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
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Table 8. Mediation tests for offer premium 
This table reports results for Sobel mediation tests on offer premiums and the takeover law index. The hypothesis tested 
is whether takeover premiums (as measured by the offer price divided by the share price one day prior to the 
announcement) mediate the effect of takeover law on target announcement returns, bidder announcement returns or 
weighted target-bidder announcement returns. All models include the full set of covariates shown in Table 6 for targets, 
bidders and the combined entity, respectively. To conserve space, only coefficients for the variables of interest are shown 
here. The number of observations in this table is less than the observations in the related tables due to the additional 
requirement of having complete observations for offer premiums. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: 
***, **, * stand for 1%, 5% and 10% significance. 
 Weighted CAR x Target CAR x Bidder CAR 
 
Model regressing dependent variable (in column header) on takeover index (direct path) 
Takeover index 1.235 (0.557)**  3.659 (1.421)**  1.022 (0.549)* 
            
Model regressing mediator on takeover law (path a) 
Takeover index 7.800 (2.480)***  7.308 (2.453)***  7.800 (2.480)*** 
            
Model regressing dependent variable on mediator and takeover law (path b) 
Offer premium 0.036 (0.007)***  0.271 (0.017)***  0.005 (0.007)  
Takeover index 0.953 (0.553)*  1.682 (1.263)  0.987 (0.552)* 
            
Sobel mediation tests 
Path a coefficient 7.800 (2.480)***  7.308 (2.453)***  7.800 (2.480)*** 
Path b coefficient 0.036 (0.007)***  0.271 (0.017)***  0.005 (0.007)  
Indirect effect (Sobel test; a∙b) 0.282 (0.106)***  1.977 (0.675)***  0.035 (0.058)  
Direct effect of takeover index 0.953 (0.553)*  1.682 (1.263)  0.987 (0.552)* 
Total effect of takeover index 1.235 (0.557)**  3.659 (1.421)**  1.022 (0.549)* 
            
Model statistics for model with mediator and takeover law index (path b) 
Observations 1002   1027   1002  
F-test 2.660   7.900   1.930  
F-test p-value 0.000   0.000   0.000  
R-squared (adj.) 0.107   0.326   0.063  
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Table 9. The effect of takeover law and provisions on bidder announcement returns 
This table reports coefficients of OLS regressions of announcement returns to bidder shareholders, that is, cumulative abnormal returns in a window of [-2,2] trading days around the takeover 
announcement. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (HC3) are in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, **, * stand for 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Takeover index 0.358 (0.45)                     
Ownership disclosure    3.138 (3.01)   2.314 (3.01)   2.569 (3.16)   3.025 (3.22)   3.051 (3.22)   3.103 (3.24)   
Mandatory bid       1.135 (1.25)   1.722 (2.28)   3.222 (2.71)   3.937 (3.00)   3.933 (3.00)   
Fair price for minority          -0.666 (2.15)   -1.174 (2.20)   -1.157 (2.21)   -0.539 (2.28)   
Squeeze-out right             -1.419 (1.52)   -0.567 (2.08)   -0.065 (2.18)   
Sell-out rights                -1.537 (2.29)   -2.048 (2.42)   
Management neutrality                   -1.826 (2.08)   
Deal value -0.945 (0.30) *** -0.951 (0.30) *** -0.958 (0.30) *** -0.963 (0.30) *** -0.963 (0.30) *** -0.967 (0.30) *** -0.975 (0.30) *** 
Toehold 0.001 (0.02)   -0.001 (0.02)   0.000 (0.02)   -0.001 (0.02)   0.000 (0.02)   -0.001 (0.02)   -0.001 (0.02)   
Hostile bid -1.579 (0.68) ** -1.607 (0.69) ** -1.616 (0.69) ** -1.626 (0.69) ** -1.610 (0.69) ** -1.616 (0.69) ** -1.582 (0.69) ** 
Cash-only transaction 0.497 (0.53)   0.487 (0.53)   0.502 (0.53)   0.506 (0.53)   0.479 (0.53)   0.461 (0.53)   0.452 (0.53)   
Cross-border transaction 0.500 (0.57)   0.543 (0.57)   0.539 (0.57)   0.551 (0.58)   0.570 (0.58)   0.580 (0.58)   0.585 (0.58)   
Diversification -0.348 (0.51)   -0.348 (0.51)   -0.353 (0.51)   -0.354 (0.51)   -0.355 (0.51)   -0.348 (0.51)   -0.349 (0.51)   
(T) CAR run-up -0.141 (0.92)   -0.121 (0.92)   -0.152 (0.92)   -0.147 (0.92)   -0.154 (0.92)   -0.177 (0.92)   -0.190 (0.92)   
(T) Age -0.020 (0.02)   -0.020 (0.02)   -0.021 (0.02)   -0.021 (0.02)   -0.022 (0.02)   -0.023 (0.02)   -0.023 (0.02)   
(T) Total assets 0.711 (0.31) ** 0.704 (0.31) ** 0.726 (0.32) ** 0.733 (0.32) ** 0.730 (0.32) ** 0.740 (0.32) ** 0.736 (0.32) ** 
(T) Tobin's Q -0.257 (0.11) ** -0.259 (0.11) ** -0.258 (0.11) ** -0.257 (0.11) ** -0.263 (0.11) ** -0.263 (0.11) ** -0.270 (0.11) ** 
(T) Leverage 1.245 (1.37)   1.260 (1.37)   1.249 (1.37)   1.259 (1.37)   1.250 (1.38)   1.250 (1.38)   1.268 (1.38)   
(T) Cash flow 2.323 (2.20)   2.289 (2.20)   2.246 (2.19)   2.203 (2.19)   2.243 (2.19)   2.200 (2.18)   2.226 (2.18)   
(T) Distressed -1.054 (0.64) * -1.064 (0.64) * -1.074 (0.64) * -1.087 (0.64) * -1.100 (0.64) * -1.124 (0.64) * -1.139 (0.64) * 
(A) Age 0.026 (0.02)   0.028 (0.02)   0.026 (0.02)   0.026 (0.02)   0.026 (0.02)   0.026 (0.02)   0.027 (0.02)   
(A) Total assets 0.207 (0.15)   0.203 (0.16)   0.204 (0.16)   0.203 (0.16)   0.205 (0.16)   0.202 (0.16)   0.208 (0.16)   
(A) Cash flow 6.223 (3.02) ** 6.296 (3.03) ** 6.209 (3.02) ** 6.237 (3.03) ** 6.271 (3.01) ** 6.324 (3.01) ** 6.229 (3.02) ** 
Target country dummies Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Industry dummies Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Year dummies Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Observations 1241   1241   1241   1241   1241   1241   1241   
R-squared (adj.) 0.065   0.065   0.065   0.065   0.064   0.064   0.064   
F-statistic 2.220   2.222   2.203   2.172   2.154   2.133   2.113   
P-value 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   
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Table 10. The effect of takeover law and provisions on weighted total announcement returns 
This table reports coefficients of OLS regressions of weighted announcement returns to target and bidder shareholders, that is, cumulative abnormal returns in a window of [-2,2] trading days around 
the takeover announcement, weighted by target and bidder market capitalization two trading days before the announcement. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors (HC3) are in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, **, * stand for 1%, 5% and 10% significance. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Takeover index 0.833 (0.46)*                   
Ownership disclosure    7.037 (2.92)** 5.908 (2.94)** 6.509 (3.14)** 7.417 (3.17)** 7.437 (3.18)** 7.383 (3.16)** 
Mandatory bid       1.560 (1.29)  2.885 (2.32)  5.727 (2.79)** 6.131 (3.05)** 6.150 (3.05)** 
Fair price for minority          -1.502 (2.21)  -2.489 (2.24)  -2.483 (2.25)  -3.329 (2.35)  
Squeeze-out right             -2.658 (1.66)  -2.185 (1.89)  -2.868 (1.94)  
Sell-out rights                -0.856 (1.92)  -0.166 (2.08)  
Management neutrality                   2.472 (2.19)  
Deal value -0.183 (0.32)  -0.200 (0.32)  -0.209 (0.32)  -0.222 (0.32)  -0.225 (0.32)  -0.227 (0.32)  -0.218 (0.32)  
Toehold -0.019 (0.02)  -0.022 (0.02)  -0.022 (0.02)  -0.022 (0.02)  -0.022 (0.02)  -0.022 (0.02)  -0.023 (0.02)  
Hostile bid 0.391 (0.73)  0.332 (0.73)  0.319 (0.73)  0.297 (0.73)  0.327 (0.73)  0.324 (0.73)  0.278 (0.73)  
Cash-only transaction 0.928 (0.55)* 0.904 (0.55)* 0.923 (0.55)* 0.931 (0.55)* 0.880 (0.55)  0.869 (0.55)  0.881 (0.55)  
Cross-border transaction 0.603 (0.57)  0.698 (0.58)  0.692 (0.58)  0.718 (0.59)  0.751 (0.58)  0.757 (0.59)  0.750 (0.59)  
Diversification -0.789 (0.53)  -0.792 (0.53)  -0.800 (0.53)  -0.803 (0.53)  -0.807 (0.53)  -0.804 (0.53)  -0.804 (0.53)  
(T) CAR run-up -1.124 (0.96)  -1.075 (0.95)  -1.117 (0.96)  -1.102 (0.96)  -1.112 (0.96)  -1.125 (0.96)  -1.107 (0.96)  
(T) Age -0.025 (0.02)  -0.024 (0.02)  -0.026 (0.02)  -0.027 (0.02)  -0.028 (0.02)  -0.028 (0.02)  -0.028 (0.02)  
(T) Total assets 1.080 (0.33)*** 1.065 (0.33)*** 1.096 (0.33)*** 1.112 (0.33)*** 1.108 (0.33)*** 1.114 (0.33)*** 1.120 (0.33)*** 
(T) Tobin's Q -0.338 (0.11)*** -0.341 (0.11)*** -0.340 (0.11)*** -0.335 (0.11)*** -0.347 (0.11)*** -0.347 (0.11)*** -0.338 (0.11)*** 
(T) Leverage 0.687 (1.39)  0.725 (1.39)  0.709 (1.39)  0.732 (1.39)  0.717 (1.40)  0.717 (1.40)  0.693 (1.40)  
(T) Cash flow 3.393 (2.29)  3.325 (2.28)  3.268 (2.29)  3.176 (2.28)  3.256 (2.27)  3.233 (2.27)  3.200 (2.27)  
(T) Distressed -1.334 (0.71)* -1.357 (0.71)* -1.370 (0.71)* -1.399 (0.71)** -1.423 (0.71)** -1.436 (0.71)** -1.416 (0.71)** 
(A) Age 0.023 (0.02)  0.027 (0.02)  0.025 (0.02)  0.025 (0.02)  0.025 (0.02)  0.025 (0.02)  0.024 (0.02)  
(A) Total assets -0.773 (0.18)*** -0.780 (0.18)*** -0.780 (0.18)*** -0.782 (0.18)*** -0.778 (0.18)*** -0.779 (0.18)*** -0.787 (0.18)*** 
(A) Cash flow 4.694 (3.09)  4.867 (3.08)  4.748 (3.09)  4.814 (3.09)  4.881 (3.05)  4.911 (3.04)  5.042 (3.07)  
Target country dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 1240  1240  1240  1240  1240  1240  1240  
R-squared (adj.) 0.083  0.083  0.083  0.083  0.084  0.084  0.084  
F-statistic 2.570  2.574  2.562  2.532  2.541  2.508  2.491  
P-value 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
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Table 11. The effect of takeover law and provisions on weighted total announcement returns – excluding UK targets 
This table reports coefficients of OLS regressions of weighted announcement returns to target and bidder shareholders, that is, cumulative abnormal returns in a window of [-2,2] trading days around 
the takeover announcement, weighted by target and bidder market capitalization two trading days before the announcement. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors (HC3) are in parentheses. Significance levels: ***, **, * stand for 1%, 5% and 10% significance. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Takeover index 1.270 (0.63)**                   
Ownership disclosure    11.472 (4.46)** 11.080 (4.48)** 13.207 (5.16)** 14.330 (5.31)*** 14.336 (5.34)*** 14.821 (5.36)*** 
Mandatory bid       2.990 (1.76)* 5.858 (2.90)** 9.005 (3.29)*** 8.995 (3.48)*** 9.516 (3.51)*** 
Fair price for minority          -3.042 (2.45)  -4.120 (2.48)* -4.123 (2.50)  -5.748 (2.80)** 
Squeeze-out right             -3.080 (1.69)* -3.095 (2.08)  -4.196 (2.19)* 
Sell-out rights                0.029 (2.30)  1.381 (2.62)  
Management neutrality                   3.722 (2.71)  
Deal value -0.328 (0.47)  -0.391 (0.48)  -0.376 (0.48)  -0.419 (0.48)  -0.449 (0.47)  -0.449 (0.47)  -0.419 (0.47)  
Toehold -0.041 (0.02)  -0.045 (0.02)* -0.044 (0.03)* -0.046 (0.03)* -0.045 (0.03)* -0.045 (0.03)* -0.046 (0.03)* 
Hostile bid -0.899 (1.30)  -1.169 (1.26)  -0.975 (1.27)  -1.109 (1.27)  -1.055 (1.25)  -1.055 (1.25)  -1.379 (1.27)  
Cash-only transaction 1.095 (0.96)  1.055 (0.95)  0.927 (0.96)  0.909 (0.96)  0.808 (0.96)  0.808 (0.96)  0.766 (0.96)  
Cross-border transaction -0.435 (0.79)  -0.280 (0.80)  -0.241 (0.80)  -0.144 (0.81)  -0.085 (0.81)  -0.085 (0.82)  -0.115 (0.81)  
Diversification -2.122 (0.91)** -2.133 (0.90)** -2.107 (0.90)** -2.075 (0.90)** -2.105 (0.89)** -2.105 (0.89)** -2.050 (0.89)** 
(T) CAR run-up -2.931 (1.90)  -2.617 (1.84)  -2.880 (1.91)  -2.840 (1.93)  -2.852 (1.91)  -2.851 (1.92)  -2.835 (1.91)  
(T) Age -0.092 (0.05)* -0.088 (0.05)  -0.096 (0.05)* -0.096 (0.05)* -0.104 (0.05)* -0.104 (0.05)* -0.103 (0.05)* 
(T) Total assets 1.285 (0.50)*** 1.295 (0.50)** 1.289 (0.50)** 1.349 (0.50)*** 1.373 (0.50)*** 1.373 (0.50)*** 1.379 (0.50)*** 
(T) Tobin's Q -0.299 (0.12)** -0.292 (0.12)** -0.312 (0.12)*** -0.307 (0.12)*** -0.318 (0.12)*** -0.318 (0.12)*** -0.305 (0.12)** 
(T) Leverage -0.110 (2.13)  -0.294 (2.14)  -0.184 (2.12)  -0.106 (2.13)  -0.150 (2.14)  -0.149 (2.15)  -0.127 (2.14)  
(T) Cash flow 2.748 (4.63)  2.065 (4.53)  2.157 (4.59)  1.667 (4.59)  1.762 (4.53)  1.764 (4.54)  1.690 (4.56)  
(T) Distressed -1.057 (1.19)  -1.002 (1.20)  -1.162 (1.18)  -1.301 (1.19)  -1.377 (1.18)  -1.377 (1.19)  -1.336 (1.19)  
(A) Age 0.052 (0.04)  0.067 (0.04)* 0.060 (0.04)  0.061 (0.04)  0.060 (0.04)  0.060 (0.04)  0.057 (0.04)  
(A) Total assets -0.719 (0.29)** -0.758 (0.29)*** -0.746 (0.29)** -0.752 (0.29)** -0.738 (0.29)** -0.738 (0.29)** -0.752 (0.29)*** 
(A) Cash flow 1.458 (6.05)  2.289 (6.11)  2.023 (6.04)  2.433 (6.06)  2.646 (5.88)  2.642 (5.90)  3.212 (6.03)  
Target country dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 532  532  532  532  532  532  532  
R-squared (adj.) 0.081  0.084  0.089  0.090  0.095  0.093  0.095  
F-statistic 1.691  1.712  1.750  1.753  1.788  1.760  1.767  
P-value 0.001  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
 
